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GENERAL INTANGIBLE OR COMMERCIAL TORT: MORAL 
RIGHTS AND STATE-BASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS 
COLLATERAL UNDER U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 9 
Lars S. Smith* 
INTRODUCTION 
When the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted Revised Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code in 1998,1 they added a new type of collateral that 
could be used as security—commercial torts.2  Prior to the 1998 revision, all 
tort claims were excluded as a form of security.3  However, when drafting 
Revised Article 9, the drafters included commercial torts as a potential asset in 
early drafts.4 
Characterizing certain rights as commercial torts can have important 
consequences in how a lender will perfect its security interest and whether it 
can obtain a secured position in intangible rights acquired after the original 
security interest was granted.  In addition, the debtor or trustee in bankruptcy 
may be able to avoid the effect of a security interest in those assets if the 
specific rules governing commercial torts were not followed.  For example, if a 
particular trade secret is more properly treated as a commercial tort rather than 
a general intangible, it is unlikely that the creditor would have a perfected 
security interest if the trade secret was created after the security interest 
originally attached.5  Even if it were a trade secret that arose before attachment 
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1
 U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2 (2002).  All citations to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code are, unless 
otherwise indicated, to the 2002 edition of Revised Article 9.  Revised Article 9 was completed in 1999.  “Old 
Article 9” refers to the 1995 edition of Uniform Commercial Code Article 9. The Uniform Commercial Code 
was last amended in 2003, but this Article does not contain any references to those amendments. 
 
2
 Id. § 9-109(d)(12). 
 
3
 U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1995) (“Old Article 9”). 
 
4
 See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 
5
 See infra note 178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment of after-acquired collateral. 
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of the original security interest, if not specifically listed in the security 
agreement, the creditor would not have a security interest in the trade secret.  
This possibility will create a strong incentive for a debtor or trustee in 
bankruptcy to attempt to recharacterize the collateral as a commercial tort 
claim to avoid the creditor’s security interests in general intangibles. 
Under Old Article 9 there was little question that the primary forms of 
federally protected intellectual property—patents,6 copyrights,7 and 
trademarks8—were treated as general intangibles and capable of being used as 
security.9  While there was some debate as to the proper process of perfecting 
such an interest,10 the category of collateral was never in dispute.11 
While the law was clear on the categories for such types of intellectual 
property, several types of intellectual property are either only protected or 
defined under state law, or are subject to minimal federal protection.  These 
intellectual property rights include trade secrets, the right of publicity, rights 
against unfair competition, and moral rights.12  Many of these forms of 
intangible rights derive from tort law.  For example, misappropriation of trade 
secrets was included in the first Restatement of Torts, and the definition of 
trade secrets from that Restatement is still relied upon by courts to this day.13 
 
 
6
 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000) for the federal law governing protection of patents. 
 
7
 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000) for the federal law governing protection of copyrights. 
 
8
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 105-1141 (2000) for the federal law governing protection of trademarks. 
 
9
 See, e.g., Aerocon Eng’g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303 F.3d 
1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (copyrights are general intangibles); Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic 
Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (patent is a general intangible); T.S. Note Co. v. United Kan. 
Bank & Trust (In re Topsy’s Shoppes, Inc. of Kan.), 131 B.R. 886, 888–89 (D. Kan. 1991) (trademarks are 
general intangibles). 
 
10
 See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d at 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that because the 
creation of a security interest in a patent does not effect a transfer of ownership in a patent, the Patent Act does 
not apply and the security interest should be perfected by filing under Article 9); see also Shubha Ghosh, The 
Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and 
Bankruptcy, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 99 (1997); Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: 
Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645 (1996); Thomas M. 
Ward, The Perfection and Priority Rules for Security Interests in Copyrights, Patents, and Trademarks: The 
Current Structural Dissonance and Proposed Legislative Cures, 53 ME. L. REV. 391, 407–49 (2001) 
(discussing the conflict between Old and Revised Article 9, and the federal intellectual property recording 
acts). 
 
11
 See generally THOMAS A. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE §§ 1:6-7, 9 (West Group 
2003). 
 
12
 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (8th ed. 2004) (defining intellectual property to include federally 
created rights in trademark, copyright, and patent, and also state-created trade secret rights, publicity rights, 
moral rights, and rights against unfair competition). 
 
13
 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2005). 
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To the extent that such intangible rights were defined solely as a right 
arising under tort law, they could not be used as security under Old Article 9.14  
If a court was willing to protect such intangible rights under Old Article 9, the 
only category these rights could fit in to was “general intangible,” which was 
the catchall category under Old Article 9.15  For example, trade secrets have 
been held to be general intangibles and thus covered by Old Article 9.16 
Since Revised Article 9 now includes “commercial torts” as a new category 
of collateral, more intangible rights defined as torts can be used as collateral in 
a commercial transaction.  It is therefore appropriate to reevaluate whether 
certain intellectual property rights, which may have been treated as general 
intangibles or excluded entirely under Old Article 9, should now be 
categorized as commercial torts under Revised Article 9.  For example, a trade 
secret may be seen as merely a tort protecting certain special relationships, 
such as between an employer and employee.  If so, the right is more akin to a 
tort and not a general intangible. 
This Article does two things.  First, it explores the extent to which forms of 
intellectual property that were not able to be used as security under Old Article 
9 are now covered as commercial torts.  Second, the Article considers whether 
forms of intellectual property, which might have been characterized as general 
intangibles under Old Article 9, are more properly characterized as commercial 
torts under Revised Article 9. 
I. GENERAL INTANGIBLES V. COMMERCIAL TORTS 
UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9 
A. General Scope of Article 917 
The purpose of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is to “provide[] 
a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal 
property and fixtures.”18  Article 9 does not govern all liens created in personal 
 
 
14
 U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1995) (“Old Article 9”). 
 
15
 Id. § 9-106 & cmt. 
 
16
 United States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (C.D.N.H. 1966). 
 
17
 What follows is a short review of the general scope of the regulation of secured transactions as set 
forth in Article 9.  This review is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of the application of Article 9 
generally, but rather, a brief review of those concepts contained in Article 9 that are relevant to a discussion of 
obtaining and perfecting security interests in general intangibles and commercial torts. 
 
18
 U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2002). 
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property, but rather, is generally limited to consensual19 security interests20 in 
personal property created by debtors for the benefit of creditors to secure 
repayment of loans.21  Thus, the creation of a nonconsensual judgment lien in 
personal property is governed by law other than Article 9.22  Nevertheless, to 
the extent that liens created outside of Article 9 affect the rights of secured 
parties in such personal property, such as judgment liens, the relative rights of 
the parties will generally be governed by Article 9.23 
Personal property subject to a security interest is “collateral” under Article 
9.24  When a creditor has been granted a security interest in such collateral, the 
creditor becomes a secured party under Article 9.25  The most common method 
for a creditor to become a secured party is for the debtor to grant a security 
interest in the debtor’s personal property by way of a written security 
agreement that describes the collateral.26  Once this is done, the security 
interest becomes enforceable against the debtor and attaches to the collateral.27  
At this point, the secured party has ensured that, as between the secured party 
and the debtor,28 the secured party will be able to seek repayment of the debt 
by proceeding against the collateral.29 
 
 
19
 Id. § 9-109 cmt. 10.  “With few exceptions (nonconsensual agricultural liens being one), this Article 
applies only to consensual security interests in personal property.”  Id. 
 
20
 “Security Interest” is defined as “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or 
performance of an obligation.”  Id. § 1-201(35). 
 
21
 Id. § 9-109(a)(1) & cmt. 2.  Article 9 also applies to certain other types of transactions in personal 
property not relevant to the topic of this Article, such as agricultural liens, U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(2), and sales of 
accounts, id. § 9-109(a)(3). 
 
22
 Id. § 9-401(a) & cmt. 6. 
 
23
 See, e.g., id. § 9-317 (the rights of lien creditors against secured parties).  Certain types of security 
interests in personal property, such as those governed by federal law, fall outside of the scope of Article 9.  Id. 
§ 9-109(c)(1).  The relative rights of parties in such a case will be determined by that federal law.  See, e.g., id. 
§ 9-311(a)(1) & cmt. 2 (giving the example of The Federal Aviation Act).  Article 9 defers to such federal law 
to the extent that federal law preempts state law.  U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 8. 
 
24
 Id. § 9-102(a)(12). 
 
25
 Id. § 9-109(a)(72). 
 
26
 Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).  Technically, the debtor would “authenticate” the security agreement.  
“Authenticate” includes signing the security agreement, but also allows for a debtor to adopt the agreement by 
a method other than signing, such as by electronic communication.  Id. § 9-102(a)(7) & cmt. 9(b).  “Security 
Agreement” is defined as “an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.”  Id. § 9-102(a)(73).  
Article 9 does not require a formal, authenticated security agreement in all cases.  A secured creditor, for 
example, can obtain an enforceable security interest in particular types of collateral by possessing them.  See, 
e.g., id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B).  Attachment by possession is not possible for either commercial torts or general 
intangibles, id. § 9-313, and will not be discussed in this Article. 
 
27
 Id. § 9-203(a). 
 
28
 A security agreement is also enforceable against purchasers of the collateral and other creditors that 
may claim an interest in the collateral.  Id. § 9-201(a). 
 
29
 See id. § 9-601(a). 
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However, to help ensure that the secured party’s security interest has 
priority over third parties, such as other secured parties, judgment lien 
creditors, and purchasers, the secured party needs to “perfect” its interest.30  
The essence of perfection under Article 9 is providing public notice to other 
creditors of the existence of the secured party’s security interest in the 
collateral.31  To perfect a security interest, the security interest must have 
attached, and the secured party must have taken the steps necessary to 
perfect.32  In most instances, a secured party will perfect its interest by filing a 
financing statement describing the collateral.33  The financing statement is a 
form34 that provides basic information about the possible existence of a 
security interest by including information such as the debtor’s name, a 
description of the collateral, and the name of the secured party.35  Thus, in the 
typical secured transaction, the debtor will have executed a security agreement 
that describes the collateral and grants a security interest in that collateral to a 
secured party, the creditor. Additionally, the secured party will have filed a 
financing statement with the central filing office for the state where the debtor 
is located.36  The creditor then becomes a perfected secured party. 
Once a creditor has taken these steps to become a perfected secured party, 
its right to proceeds resulting from a disposition of the collateral after a 
default37 will be determined by the creditor’s relative priority with respect to 
the collateral.  In general, priority is determined by the first to file rule—that is, 
a secured party will have greater rights to enforce its security interest in the 
collateral if it filed its financing statement before other creditors either filed 
 
 
30
 Id. § 9-308 cmt. 2 states that 
[a] perfected security interest may still be or become subordinate to other interests. See, e.g., 
Sections 9-320, 9-322. However, in general, after perfection the secured party is protected against 
creditors and transferees of the debtor and, in particular, against any representative of creditors in 
insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor. 
 
31
 Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2; see also id. § 9-104 cmt. 3 (control as sufficient public notice of security interest). 
 
32
 Id. § 9-308. 
 
33
 Id. § 9-310(a).  Perfecting by filing is the default method of perfecting a security interest, id., although 
there are other methods of perfecting, such as by possession, id. § 9-313.  This Article focuses only on 
perfection by filing since this is the only method for perfecting a security interest in general intangibles and 
commercial torts.  Id. 
 
34
 Id. § 9-521 (providing a sample form financing statement). 
 
35
 Id. § 9-502(a).  This is the minimum information needed for the financing statement to be effective.  
Additional information will be needed to file the form, such as the address of the debtor.  Id. §§ 9-516(b), 
9-520(a). 
 
36
 Id. § 9-501(a)(2) & cmt. 2 (usually the Secretary of State’s office). 
 
37
 Id. § 9-601. “The rights of a secured party to enforce its security interest in collateral after the debtor’s 
default are an important feature of a secured transaction.”  Id. § 9-601 cmt. 2. 
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their own financing statements38 or otherwise obtained their liens on the same 
collateral.39 
B. Characterizing the Collateral 
The preceding section describes the basic structure of obtaining and 
perfecting a security interest in collateral  under Article 9.  One stated purpose 
of the adoption of Article 9 was to unify the varied methods of creating 
security interests in different forms of personal property into a single system.40  
Even so, Article 9 retains distinctions among types of personal property for 
many purposes.  In particular, the requirements for perfection depend upon the 
particular type of collateral in question.  For example, certain types of 
collateral can only be perfected by filing,41 whereas possession is the only 
permitted method for others.42  Even as to those forms of collateral that may be 
perfected by filing, different requirements may apply.43 
Revised Article 9 has an extensive definitional section that defines the 
types of collateral it covers.44  To apply the correct rules to a form of 
intellectual property, one must determine the type of collateral, which includes 
intellectual property.  To do so, one must distinguish those types of intellectual 
property that are properly categorized as general intangibles from those that 
should be categorized as commercial torts under Revised Article 9.  This 
section discusses the definitions relevant to determining the proper 
characterization of intellectual property rights as collateral. 
 
 
38
 Id. § 9-322(a). 
 
39
 Id. § 9-317(a)(2)(B). 
 
40
 Id. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (“[Article 9] provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security 
interests in personal property.”). 
Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely on form, are 
not retained; the Article applies to all transactions intended to create security interests in personal 
property and fixtures, and the single term “security interest” substitutes for the variety of 
descriptive terms which had grown up at common law and under a hundred-year accretion of 
statutes. 
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (1995) (“Old Article 9”). 
 
41
 See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2002), which states that filing is the mandatory method of perfection unless 
another method of perfection is permitted. 
 
42
 See id. § 9-312(b)(3), which states that a security interest in money can only be perfected by 
possession. 
 
43
 For example, filing is generally not necessary to perfect a security interest in consumer goods if the 
secured party advanced the credit necessary to allow the debtor to purchase such goods.  Id. § 9-309(a) & cmt. 
3. 
 
44
 Id. § 9-102. 
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1. Definition of Intellectual Property 
Intellectual property is not specifically defined under Article 9.  The 
comments explaining the definition of “general intangibles” mention that 
“various categories of intellectual property” are examples of general 
intangibles,45 but then fail to describe which categories are included.  By using 
the phrase “various categories,” one may reasonably conclude that not all 
forms of intellectual property are to be characterized as general intangibles.  
Thus, Article 9 must look to other law for the definition of intellectual 
property. 
“Intellectual Property” is a broad concept, often defined to include the 
following types of rights: patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, moral 
rights, rights of publicity, and rights against unfair competition.46  Thus, it is 
commonly accepted that the term “intellectual property” includes more than 
just patents, trademarks, and copyrights.  The key element binding these types 
of rights is that they all relate to products of the human mind or human 
intellect.47 
From this list, both patents and copyrights are personal property rights 
created exclusively by federal law.  Patents are governed by Title 35 of the 
United States Code,48 which specifically defines them as personal property.49  
Title 17 of the United States Code governs the rights granted under federal 
copyright law.50  Both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act preempt state law 
with respect to the rights covered under each Act.51 
 
 
45
 Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d). 
 
46
 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 308 
(3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA]; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th  
ed. 1999). 
 
47
 MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 46; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 
48
 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-76 (2000). 
 
49
 Id. § 261. 
 
50
 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000). 
 
51
 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (patent law preempts state 
law); see 17 U.S.C. § 301 (The Copyright Act expressly preempts “all legal or equitable rights that are 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in section 106 [] in 
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression . . . .”).  Since the copyright preemption 
clause only preempts works that are fixed, works that have not been fixed can only be protected under state 
copyright law.  Id. § 301(b)(1). 
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Trademarks, however, are protected under both state52 and federal law.53  
The Lanham Act does not preempt state law except to the extent that 
registration of a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
grants nationwide protection even in jurisdictions where the mark has not been 
used.54 
Many of the other forms of intellectual property, although often referenced 
in federal law, are defined by state law.  For example, while the Bankruptcy 
Code includes trade secrets as a form of intellectual property,55 this federal law 
looks to state law to define trade secret.56  Trade secrets are generally protected 
under state civil laws such as the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.57  No federal law 
protecting trade secrets as commercial assets exists.58  Some types of 
intellectual property, such as rights of publicity, are defined under state law but 
have no direct protection under federal law.  For example,59 there is no 
federally recognized right of publicity,60 but violation of the state created right 
may give rise to an analogous false endorsement claim under section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act.61 
Moral rights straddle both federal and state law.  One form of moral rights 
is specifically protected under the Copyright Act—the rights attribution and 
integrity for certain visual artists under the Visual Artists Rights Act.62  Moral 
rights may also be protected under the common law, § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, or under state law.63 
This Article focuses on those types of intellectual property that are created 
under state law and moral rights as protected both under federal and state law.  
 
 
52
 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:1-4 (4th ed. 
2004). 
 
53
 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000). 
 
54
 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 22:2. 
 
55
 11 U.S.C. §101(35A) (2000). 
 
56
 Harmon v. McGee (In re McGee), 157 B.R. 966, 975 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). 
 
57
 Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433–67 (1990). 
 
58
 The federal Economic Espionage Act provides for criminal liability for theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1832 (2000), and includes its own definition of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).  However, this statute 
does not include a private right of action, and so does not create a federal trade secret law similar to the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
 
59
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, 
§ 6:135 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter  PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY]; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 28:14. 
 
60
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, §§ 6:133–34 (2d ed. 2004). 
 
61
 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). 
 
62
 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
 
63
 See infra notes 221–236 and accompanying text for a discussion of moral rights. 
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Patents, trademarks, and copyrights have historically been treated by courts as 
general intangibles under Article 9.64  Since the drafters of Revised Article 9 
likely did not intend to alter this understanding,65 such intellectual property 
rights are not the focus of this Article. 
2. Definition of General Intangible 
Article 9 defines a “general intangible” as 
any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, 
chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, 
goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters 
of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. 
The term includes payment intangibles and software.66 
As can be seen by this definition, a general intangible is a type of collateral 
defined in the negative.  It is the residual category for personal property 
covered by Article 9 that does not fit into any other category.67  Thus, if the 
collateral is not included in a specifically defined form of collateral, it will fall 
into the general intangible category. 
A key requirement is, of course, that the property in question be 
“intangible.”  The type of collateral included under general intangibles, 
however, is narrower than what would normally be defined as “intangible 
property.”  For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines intangible property as 
property “that lacks a physical existence,”68 such as stock options.69  Stock 
options would likely be characterized under Article 9 as investment property,70 
thus specifically excluded from the Article 9 definition of general intangible.71  
 
 
64
 See, e.g., Aerocon Eng’g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303 F.3d 
1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (copyrights  are  general intangibles); Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic 
Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (patents are general intangibles); Roman Cleanser Co. v. 
Nat’l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 943 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) 
(trademarks are general intangibles). 
 
65
 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (2000) (“‘General intangible’ is the residual category of personal property, 
including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral.  Examples are various 
categories of intellectual property . . . .”). 
 
66
 Id. § 9-102(a)(42). 
 
67
 Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d). 
 
68
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1253 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
69
 Id. 
 
70
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49).  Specifically, it would be characterized as a “security entitlement” in the 
definition of investment property.  Id. 
 
71
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). 
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Therefore, the general intangible category does not include all intangible 
property. More specifically, general intangibles exclude collateral that is a 
good72 or for which its existence is embodied in some physical object, such as 
a document73 or instrument.74  Also excluded are obligations to pay a debt that 
are not embodied in a particular physical object, such as accounts receivable or 
deposit accounts.75 
The comments to section 9-102, the definitional section of Revised Article 
9, mention that general intangibles includes “various categories of intellectual 
property,”76 but do not explain what those various categories include.  Thus, 
the definition of general intangible does not necessarily include all forms of 
intellectual property.77 
3. Definition of Commercial Tort 
Article 9 defines “commercial tort claim” as 
a claim arising in tort with respect to which: (A) the claimant is an 
organization; or (B) the claimant is an individual and the claim: (i) 
arose in the course of the claimant’s business or profession; and (ii) 
does not include damages arising out of personal injury to or the 
death of an individual.78 
Thus, a commercial tort is either a tort where the claimant is an 
organization other than an individual79 or a tort where the claimant is an 
individual and the tort relates to the person’s business.  Specifically excluded 
are torts for personal injury or death.80 
Commercial torts were added to the categories of collateral covered by 
Article 9 in the 1998 revisions.  The Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC 
 
 
72
 Id. 
 
73
 Id. 
 
74
 Id. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d). 
 
77
 WARD, supra note 11, §§ 1:6-7, 9.  As noted, it is generally accepted that patents, trademarks, and 
copyrights clearly fall within the definition of general intangible.  Id. 
 
78
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13). 
 
79
 U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (2002).  The definition under the pre-revision version of Article 1 is more 
cumbersome: “‘Organization’ includes a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, 
business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, 
or any other legal or commercial entity.”  Id. § 1-201(28) (1999). 
 
80
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13)(B)(ii) (2000). 
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(“PEB”) discussed including commercial torts in its 1992 report about the need 
to revise Article 9.81  Many commentators had noted that the reason for 
excluding torts as collateral under Article 9 did not make sense.82  
Additionally, the PEB received two memoranda outlining the reasons why torts 
should be included as collateral under Article 9.  One important reason was  
some lenders were already taking security interests in torts to the extent 
permitted under state law.83  While the PEB was not willing to permit all torts 
to function as collateral under Article 9, the PEB did broaden Article 9 to 
include a subset of torts that relate to a debtor’s business.84 
(a) “Arising in Tort” 
Revised Article 9 allows the creation of security interests in those forms of 
commercial claims that are “arising in tort.”85  This seemingly simple phrase 
carries with it subtle complexities.  No clear definition of a tort exists beyond 
the generally accepted “civil wrong.”  Black’s Law Dictionary expands on this 
concept, defining a tort as “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for 
which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of damages; a breach of 
a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one 
another.”86  Although this definition suggests that all claims outside of contract 
law are torts, that interpretation is too broad.  Professor Dobbs explained that 
“[t]he essence of tort is the defendant’s potential for civil liability to the victim 
for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victim’s potential for 
compensation or other relief.”87  The key distinction, according to Dobbs, is 
 
 
81
 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE U.C.C., PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
ARTICLE 9: REPORT 58–59 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter PEB REPORT]. 
 
82
 See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, 8 HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-104:12 (2002) 
(“In an age of substantial money judgments, the right to pursue a tort claim may be extremely valuable, and 
but for public policy impediments in some jurisdictions and the inherent juridical risks involved in pursuing a 
tort claim, these rights might well make for good collateral.”); Amanda K. Esquibel, An Article 9 Primer 
Regarding Uninsured Collateral Destroyed by a Tortfeasor, 46 KAN. L. REV. 211 (1998); Harold R. 
Weinberg, They Came from “Beyond the Pale”: Security Interests in Tort Claims, 83 KY. L.J. 443 (1994). 
 
83
 PEB REPORT, supra note 81, 549–88 (Memoranda of Professor Harold R. Weinberg). 
 
84
 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 60 (2001). One specific problem with pledging the right to the damages 
received from winning a claim for a tort is that there is a long-standing tradition that torts not be assignable.  
Id. 
 
85
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13). 
 
86
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
87
 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (2000). 
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that torts are concerned with fault and the defendant is usually morally at fault 
for the wrong committed.88 
Tort law is also concerned with protecting “interests,” which are described 
as “a person’s interest in (1) physical security and autonomy; (2) emotional 
security and other intangible interests such as privacy and reputation; and (3) 
economic security and opportunity.”89  The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
notes that the interest protected is “anything which is the object of human 
desire.”90  This interest, as understood under tort law, is distinguishable from 
the proprietary rights recognized in property law.  Tort law protects human 
interests that may not be legally recognized as property.  For example, the right 
to be free from assault is not a property right, but rather an interest protected 
under tort law.  Thus, whether tort law will protect an interest does not hinge 
on the person owning anything.91  There are, of course, some property-based 
torts, such as trespass to land.92  Trespass to land, however, is concerned with 
“invasions of the interest in the exclusive possession and physical condition of 
land.”93  Anyone in exclusive control over property has sufficient possession to 
bring a claim for trespass to land, even if the person has no legal right to the 
property.94  Thus, the interest protected by this tort is a possessory interest as 
opposed to an ownership interest.95 
 
 
88
 Id.  This is not universally true, however, because the concept of strict liability, in which proof of fault 
is not at issue, is also part of tort law. 
 
89
 Id. 
 
90
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  § 1 cmt. a (1965). 
 
91
 Id. § 1 cmt. f. 
The word “interest” is used in the various Restatements in two senses: the one the sense here 
defined, the other denoting the beneficial side of legal relations, both generically to include the 
aggregate of “rights,” “powers,” “privileges,” and “immunities,” and distributively to mean any 
one of them. There is this fundamental difference between the two usages. As the word “interest” 
is used in this Restatement, it carries no implication as to whether it is legally recognized or not. 
When used in the second sense, the word “interest” denotes advantages which are legally 
recognized as incident to the possession or ownership of property and the like. 
Id. 
 
92
 Id. § 158. 
 
93
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS scope note to ch. 7. 
 
94
 Id. § 157 cmt. b.  (“Possession of land may be acquired by one who is not by law entitled to it and 
thus, as against another, may not be rightful.  Consequently, a disseisor is a possessor from the moment that his 
occupancy begins, although as between himself and the true owner, he is not entitled to possession until his 
adverse possession has ripened into ownership by lapse of time.”). 
 
95
 Id. scope note to ch. 7. 
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Tort claims generally focus on vindicating a wrongful interference with a 
person’s interest in physical, emotional, or economic security.96  
Unfortunately, this leaves a great deal of overlap between tort and property 
law.  For example, trespass to land and trespass to chattels are both torts that 
vindicate the interest in being free from wrongful interference with the right of 
exclusive possession of property.97  These torts exist, however, to vindicate the 
important property law right of exclusive possession. 
Many forms of intellectual property have their genesis in tort law, not 
property law.  For example, modern trademark law is a part of the law of unfair 
competition, which was originally considered part of tort law.98  If an 
intellectual property right is more aptly characterized as a claim arising in tort, 
this will have a dramatic effect on its treatment under Article 9.99 
(b) Proceeds v. Commercial Tort 
Further confusing the matter, under Article 9, some torts against collateral 
are classified as “proceeds.”100  The Article 9 definition of “proceeds” includes 
“claims arising out of the loss, . . . interference with the use of, defects or 
infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.”101  Therefore, a trespass 
to chattels case, while strictly speaking a tort, would be considered proceeds 
under Article 9 if the chattel in question were already collateral under the 
security agreement.102  This means that where a tort claim is based on acts 
against collateral, the rules governing security interests in goods would apply, 
not the more restrictive rules for commercial torts.  Likewise, an infringement 
action for intellectual property is also a proceed.  Thus, for a form of intangible 
right to be treated solely as a commercial tort, the underlying interest must not 
be recognized as a proprietary right that is treated as a general intangible. 
 
 
96
 DOBBS, supra note 87, § 1. 
 
97
 Id. § 4. 
 
98
 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 1:15. 
 
99
 See infra notes 137–213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consequences of characterizing 
collateral as a commercial tort claim. 
 
100
 See William J. Murphy, Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property, Appendix 10-Commercial Tort Claims, 41 IDEA 477, 477–79 (2002) (distinguishing 
“infringement claims offered separately as original collateral (special handling required) from those claims that 
become collateral because they are the ‘proceeds’ of general intangible collateral already held by the secured 
creditor.”). 
 
101
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(D) (2002) (limiting the value of the claim to the value of the collateral). 
 
102
 Id.  Of course, if the tort occurred before the debtor granted a security interest to the secured party in 
the chattels, such tort would not be proceeds because the chattels would not have been collateral at the time the 
tort occurred. 
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To the extent that a tort claim exists for the violation of some right in 
property that is collateral under Article 9, then that claim is proceeds and, 
therefore, not a commercial tort.103  The same is true of claims for violations of 
the types of intellectual property that are treated as general intangibles.  Thus, a 
claim for infringement of a trademark subject to a security interest will be 
treated as a general intangible because the underlying trademark is treated as 
such.104 
This means that deciding whether the right exists apart from the tort claim 
impacts how the asset is characterized.  For example, if a trade secret is held to 
be a general intangible, a claim for misappropriation is merely proceeds of the 
trade secret.  If the court characterizes the right as arising out of the tort 
itself,105 however, the asset is the claim itself, and therefore, a commercial tort. 
(c) Tort v. Thing in Action 
The definition of general intangible in Article 9 includes “things in 
action.”106 A thing in action is the English translation for a “chose” in action.107  
“A chose in action is a personal right not reduced into possession, but 
recoverable by a suit at law.”108 This definition is often interpreted broadly to 
include all rights recoverable by suit, which would include torts.109  For 
example, licenses of intellectual property are considered to be things in 
action.110 
While a tort is arguably something recoverable by a suit at law, commercial 
torts are specifically excluded from the Article 9 definition of general 
intangible.111  Therefore, an intellectual property right that might otherwise be 
characterized as a thing in action under the common law could still be treated 
as a commercial tort, notwithstanding the inclusion of things in action under 
the definition of general intangibles. 
 
 
103
 Id. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds). 
 
104
 Id.; see also WARD, supra note 11, § 1:10. 
 
105
 For example, treating a trade secret not as property but as protection for an employer’s interest in 
preventing a former employee from using the employer’s confidential information to compete against the 
employer. 
 
106
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). 
 
107
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
108
 63 AM. JUR. 2D Property § 22 (1997). 
 
109
 Id. § 23. 
 
110
 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d). 
 
111
 Id. § 9-102(a)(42).  Commercial torts were excluded because they are dealt with as a separate category 
of collateral.  Id. § 9-102(a)(42) cmt. 5(d). 
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(d) Right to Assign Commercial Torts and Things in Action 
Torts were not assignable at common law.112  As a result, they were not a 
useful source of collateral because the creditor could never be assigned 
ownership of the claim.  That general rule has changed dramatically in recent 
years.  Most things in action, including torts, are now assignable113 with the 
exception of certain types of claims, such as personal torts.114  Non-assignable 
personal torts include claims based on assault and battery, personal injury, 
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, defamation, 
conspiracy to injure another’s business, and unfair and deceptive trade 
practices.115 
The reason personal torts are not usually assignable is that such 
assignments are against public policy because they promote champerty.116  
Champerty is the transfer of a claim to a third party who then pursues the claim 
on his own behalf.117  The purpose of the champerty doctrine was to “prevent 
officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious and 
speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of society, lead to corrupt 
practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.”118 
Revised Article 9, to the extent that it permits the use of commercial torts 
as security, is not intended to change other laws outside of Article 9 regarding 
the assignability of a tort claim.119  Therefore, to the extent that the granting of 
a security interest in a commercial tort is deemed to be an illegal assignment of 
a tort claim as champerty, the assignment would presumably be invalid. 
 
 
112
 Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Assignability  of Claim for Legal Malpractice, 40 A.L.R. 4th 684 
(1985). 
 
113
 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 53 (2004). 
 
114
 Id. § 63. 
 
115
 Id. § 64. Note, in some jurisdictions, no tort is assignable until judgment. Id. § 60 (such as New 
Jersey); see, e.g., Vill. of Ridgewood v. Shell Oil Co., 673 A.2d 300, 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 
116
 Horton v. New S. Ins. Co., 468 S.E.2d 856, 858 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
 
117
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
118
 Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (citation omitted). 
 
119
 U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(g) (2002).  “Although security interests in commercial tort claims are within its 
scope, this Article does not override other applicable law restricting the assignability of a tort claim.” Id; see 
also id. § 9-401(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Sections 9-406, 9-407, 9-408, and 
9-409, whether a debtor’s rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is governed by law 
other than this article.”). 
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C. Distinguishing Commercial Torts from General Intangibles 
Under Article 9, the categories of general intangibles and commercial torts 
are mutually exclusive—the collateral may be one or the other, but not both.  
This is derived from the definition of general intangible, which specifically 
excludes commercial torts.120  Because general intangible is the residual type 
of collateral category, it must be determined whether the intellectual property 
fits in the commercial tort category.  If it does, it cannot be a general 
intangible; conversely, if the intellectual property is not a commercial tort, it 
must be a general intangible. 
To make this determination, two issues must be considered.  First, is the 
intellectual property right directed at vindicating ancillary interests in the 
owner or creator of the right?  Second, to what extent is the right fully 
alienable?  If the right is primarily directed at protecting interests ancillary to 
the right as defined and is not alienable, it is likely a commercial tort.  
Alternatively, if the intellectual property right consists of exclusive rights 
unrelated to the creator or owner and it is fully assignable, it is a general 
intangible. 
1. Does the Intellectual Property Right Vindicate an Interest Ancillary to 
the Underlying Right 
Whether an intellectual property right should be treated as a tort rather than 
a general intangible is related to whether intangible rights should generally be 
treated as property.  Professor Ward, in his treatise Intellectual Property in 
Commercial Transactions, posits two questions that determine whether an 
intangible right is property: “Is the primary or underlying right absolute or co-
relative?  Is the right definable in terms of some underlying res or is it merely a 
right of action for a specifically defined wrong?”121 
Under Article 9, the issue is not whether the rights are property, however 
defined, because Article 9 permits both general intangibles and commercial 
torts to function as collateral.  Nevertheless, these questions are helpful in 
determining the dividing line between an intellectual property right that should 
be treated as a commercial tort rather than a general intangible. 
 
 
120
 Id. § 9-102(a)(42). 
 
121
 WARD, supra note 11, § 1:4.  Professor Ward includes a third question, not relevant to this discussion, 
regarding whether contract rights arising out of intellectual property rights are themselves property.  Id. 
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The essence of the questions posed by Professor Ward is whether the 
intellectual property right stands alone, apart from the creator, or instead exists 
to protect some ancillary interest of the creator or owner of the right.  As 
discussed above, tort law is generally focused on vindicating a wrongful 
interference with a person’s interest in physical, emotional, or economic 
security.122  In this sense, the interests protected by tort law are co-relative in 
that the scope of the “right” to be free from a wrongful interference is really 
only determined by the nature and degree of the interference. 
This is not to suggest that there are never any rights underlying a tort.  For 
example, the tort of intentional interference with performance of contract by a 
third person123 applies where a person “intentionally and improperly 
frustrate[s] dealings that have been reduced to the form of a contract.”124  Thus, 
this tort supports an underlying contractual right.  The claim is not based upon 
breach of contract, however, because the tortfeasor is interfering with someone 
else’s contract.125  The tort exists to protect a person’s interest in avoiding 
wrongful interference by a third party with an enforceable contract, and the 
right does not arise until an improper interference has occurred.126 The 
quantum of damages from a breach of contract claim can be determined by 
reference to the nature and scope of performance agreed upon by the parties in 
that contract.  The quantum of damages arising from a tortious interference 
with a contract cannot truly be valued until the interference has occurred.  
Additionally, the quantum of damages is dependent upon the nature of the acts 
committed and the harm caused to the claimant. 
The comments to Article 9 further illustrate this point.  Assume that a 
business owns a factory, and that a third party wrongfully causes the business’ 
factory to explode.127  Clearly the business had an interest in not having its 
factory explode and would be able to bring a tort claim against the third party 
(either for negligence or for an intentional tort).  That does not mean, however, 
 
 
122
 DOBBS, supra note 87, § 1. 
 
123
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1965). 
 
124
 Id. § 766 cmt. b. 
 
125
 Id. § 766 (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except 
a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not 
to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the 
failure of the third person to perform the contract.”) (emphasis added).  The plaintiff may still have a separate 
cause of action against the third party (the party to the contract) even though the tortfeasor is liable under this 
tort.  Id. § 766 cmt. v. 
 
126
 See id. § 737 (discussing the elements of what makes an interference improper). 
 
127
 U.C.C. § 9-108 cmt. 5 (using the hypothetical given in the comments to Article 9 to explain the 
example of a commercial tort). 
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that the business has an intangible property right in being free from exploding 
factories.  The rights that the business has relate to the claims that result from 
the explosion of the factory.  That is, the business has rights, but those rights 
are not absolute but rather co-relative, determined by the scope of the violation 
of its interest in being free from third parties causing its factories to explode. 
When does an intellectual property right exist on its own, and when is it 
defined by its relationship to some other interest?  In analyzing whether certain 
intellectual property rights are better treated as commercial torts under Article 
9, the question is whether the intellectual property right in question exists 
primarily to remedy a wrong committed against the creator or owner of the 
right.  If the essence of the intellectual property right is the “right” of the 
creator or owner to be free from an interference with that person’s business or 
personal interests, it is properly categorized as a commercial tort.  If the claim 
solely vindicates an exclusive right in the intellectual property asset itself, 
however, such right should be treated as a general intangible. 
For example, the rights protected under a patent are directed towards the 
invention covered by the patent, not the professional or personal interests of 
the inventor or assignee.  That is not to say that the owner does not benefit 
from winning a patent infringement claim.  Certainly the owner does benefit in 
such a case.  However, patent infringement is proven solely based on the 
claims contained in the patent, regardless of the identity of the owner or the 
owner’s interest in the patent.128  By comparison, an unfair competition claim 
(a doctrine often included in the list of intellectual property rights)129 is defined 
as a generalized right to be free from wrongful interference with a right to 
compete.  It is directed at vindicating a particular company’s interest in fair 
competition and is proven by showing how a company’s business was harmed 
by the wrongful acts of a competitor.130  It is not, however, a stand-alone right 
in free competition.131 
 
 
128
 This is not to say that the interests of the patentee or the assignee are irrelevant—they will often impact 
the scope of the remedies.  However, whether there is infringement in the first instance is not determined based 
on such considerations. 
 
129
 See infra notes 238–240 and accompanying text. 
 
130
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 & cmt. g. (1995). 
 
131
 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999) (“To 
sweep within the Fourteenth Amendment the elusive property interests that are ‘by definition’ protected by 
unfair-competition law would violate our frequent admonition that the Due Process Clause is not merely a 
‘font of tort law.’” (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976))). The Supreme Court, in analyzing 
whether there is a “property right in freedom from a competitor’s false advertising about its own products” for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, held that a tort is not property simply because it 
protects a property interest.  Id. at 673. 
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Thus, where the intellectual property right is easily defined as a separate, 
stand-alone right, the value of which is not determined in relation to some 
other interest, such right should be characterized as a general intangible.  
However, if the rights protected under a form of intellectual property are 
primarily directed towards vindicating the interests of the owner or creator of 
the right, rather than the creation or protection of the underlying intellectual 
property itself, it should be treated as a commercial tort.132 
2. Is the Intellectual Property Right Fully Alienable? 
If an intellectual property right has been historically recognized as fully 
alienable, this suggests that the right should be treated as a general intangible.  
For example, patents are statutorily recognized as a form of personal property 
that may be fully assigned to an unrelated third party.133  In fact, employees are 
often contractually obligated to assign patent rights to their employer, 
including pending patent applications.134  Copyrights are almost as fully 
alienable as patents, although there is a narrow exception which limits the 
alienability for works created by individuals: under the Copyright Act, an 
author may reclaim a copyrighted work thirty-five years after a transfer occurs 
or the work was published.135  Notwithstanding this narrow exception, it is 
generally accepted that copyrights are fully alienable. 
Unlike patents and copyrights, many torts are still not assignable,136 
particularly those that relate to personal injury.  To the extent that an 
intellectual property right is not assignable, or its assignability is limited, this 
should favor the right being categorized as a commercial tort. 
3. How to Apply 
The test cannot be applied in a mathematical fashion.  First, one has to 
determine how a particular intellectual property right fits into the test: Is it a 
self contained right, and to what extent is it alienable?  Two easy 
characterizations exist.  If an intellectual property right is both defined without 
reference to any ancillary interests of the creator or owner and is fully alienable 
 
 
132
 The distinction is not based upon whether the intellectual property right allows one to exclude others—
the rights described in this Article all permit, to a greater or lesser extent, the right to prevent others from 
exercising the right. 
 
133
 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
 
134
 DONALD S. CHISUM, 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 22.01, 22.03 (1978). 
 
135
 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2000).  This right does not cover works made for hire.  Id. § 203(a)(1). 
 
136
 See supra notes 112–119 and accompanying text. 
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under law, it is a general intangible.  If, instead, the intellectual property right 
exists primarily to support or vindicate a right of the owner or creator and is 
not alienable, it is a commercial tort. 
Between those extremes, there are many possible variations.  One must 
weigh and balance which of the two factors is most dominant.  For example, 
while the right may exist to vindicate personal interests of the creator, it may 
be treated in law as fully alienable.  In such a case, the courts may see the 
power to transfer the right as paramount and characterize the right as a general 
intangible.  It may be that the answer depends on the particular circumstances 
of how the intellectual property right is being used. 
II. IMPACT OF CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ASSET 
The purpose of Article 9 is to provide a system governing the creation of 
consensual security interests in personal property.137  Many important 
consequences flow from the characterization of assets under Article 9.  To start 
with, not every type of collateral that can be termed personal property is 
included within the scope of Article 9.  A number of categories of assets are 
excluded,138 such as the assignment of a claim for wages or salary,139 and tort 
claims other than commercial tort claims.140 
Even for those assets covered under Article 9, characterization of the 
collateral has an impact on the methods and consequences of obtaining a 
perfected security interest in collateral.  This Article will focus on the 
differences between perfecting a security interest in general intangibles and 
commercial torts. 
A. Attachment 
In the event that a debtor is unable to repay a loan, a lender will seek 
repayment by seizing and selling the debtor’s assets.  Lenders have a choice 
when they extend credit whether to obtain a lien on the debtor’s assets to 
secure repayment of the loan.  If they do not, and the lender is unsecured, then 
only upon the issuance of an order of a court will the lender have the authority 
to seize such assets.  If the lender chooses to be a secured lender, then the 
 
 
137
 U.C.C. § 9-109(a). 
 
138
 Id. § 9-109(d). 
 
139
 Id. § 9-109(d)(3). 
 
140
 Id. § 9-109(d)(12). 
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lender will have the debtor grant to such lender a security interest in particular 
collateral to hold secure repayment of the loan.  A lender seeking to use 
personal property to secure repayment must meet the requirements of Article 9 
for those types of personal property covered by Article 9.  The first step in this 
process is to ensure that the security interest attaches to the collateral. 
Three elements are generally required for attachment to occur: 
• The lender must have given value, usually by extending credit 
to the debtor; 
• The debtor must have  rights in the collateral; and 
• The debtor must have agreed to the creation of the security 
interest, as evidenced by authorizing a security agreement, by 
granting possession to the creditor, or granting control over the 
collateral to the creditor.141 
As soon as all three of these conditions are met, the security interest of the 
creditor will attach142 and be enforceable between the lender and the debtor.143 
The characterization of the collateral is key to determining which methods 
of attachment are adequate under the third element of attachment.  Because 
intellectual property will be characterized as either a general intangible or a 
commercial tort, the only acceptable method of evidencing an agreement by 
the debtor to the creation of a security interest is by authenticating a security 
agreement.144  That is to say, the debtor will usually execute a written 
document called a security agreement, which describes the collateral.  In this 
regard, commercial torts and general intangibles are similar.  However, what 
constitutes an adequate description in such a security agreement for these 
respective types of collateral varies dramatically. 
To create an enforceable security interest, the description in the security 
agreement must reasonably identify the collateral.145  While a supergeneric146 
 
 
141
 Id. § 9-203(b). 
 
142
 Id. 
 
143
 Id. § 9-203(a). 
 
144
 A security interest cannot attach in either general intangibles or commercial torts by way of possession 
or control.  See id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) to (D). 
 
145
 Id. § 9-108(a). 
 
146
 This term is the heading to U.C.C. § 9-108(c). 
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description, such as “all collateral,” is not adequate,147 for most collateral the 
description can be quite broad.  Thus, a description by type of collateral, such 
as “all general intangibles,” will be adequate to create a security interest in all 
of the debtor’s intellectual property that is characterized as a general 
intangible.148  That is, a description listing general intangibles will create a 
security interest in all of the debtor’s patents, copyrights, and trademarks. 
The same is not true for commercial torts.149  A listing by type of collateral, 
such as “all commercial torts,” will be inadequate.  For commercial torts, the 
description must be more specific; however, not all that much detail is 
required.  The official comments to section 9-108 provide the following 
explanation: 
[A] description such as ‘all tort claims arising out of the explosion of 
debtor’s factory’ would suffice, even if the exact amount of the 
claim, the theory on which it may be based, and the identity of the 
tortfeasor(s), are not described. (Indeed, those facts may not be 
known at the time.)150 
Nevertheless, this requires the lender to provide a description that is more 
specific than typical boilerplate provision.  The justification mentioned in the 
comments is that the drafters did not want to allow a debtor inadvertently to 
encumber commercial tort claims.151  As a result, a secured party who wants to 
take a security interest in a form of intellectual property that is characterized as 
a commercial tort claim must list the claim with more specificity than 
“commercial tort claims.” 
An interesting question is whether a description of a commercial tort is 
adequate even if the debtor does not yet know it has occurred.  For example, 
would a description such as “all tort claims arising from unfair competition by 
a competitor against the debtor” be adequate where the debtor is not aware of 
any specific acts of competitors constituting unfair competition?  The example 
of the factory explosion provided in the comments to section 9-108 states that 
 
 
147
 U.C.C. § 9-108(c). 
 
148
 Id. § 9-108(b)(1). 
 
149
 Id. § 9-108(e). 
 
150
 Id. § 9-108 cmt. 5. 
 
151
 Id.  The drafters also included a requirement for more specific descriptions regarding consumer 
transactions covering “consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity account.” 
Id. § 9-108(e)(2). 
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the lender does not have to know the precise theory of liability or identity of 
the tortfeasor for the description to be adequate.152 
This description for unfair competition claims would appear adequate 
considering the example, and function to capture all unfair competition tort 
claims existing at the time of creation of the security interest, even if the debtor 
did not know that the torts had occurred.  This description is distinguishable 
from the example, because the debtor knows that an explosion has occurred at 
its factory, even if it does not know the precise nature of the tort claims that the 
debtor will be able to bring.  By comparison, if the “all unfair competition 
claims” description does not relate to specific acts causing a loss to the 
company, such a description would presumably be akin to a description by 
type, not a description of a specific incident giving rise to a commercial tort 
claim. 
B. Perfection 
Perfection is the method by which the secured party attempts to ensure that 
its security interest in collateral is superior to the claims of other parties that 
have an interest in the same collateral.153  That is to say, if a secured party has 
not perfected its security interest, Article 9 sets out which other creditors and 
third parties, such as purchasers, will have a superior interest in the 
collateral.154  In order for a creditor to perfect, its security interest must have 
attached and the creditor must have taken all steps necessary to perfect that 
attachment.155 
Depending on the type of collateral, Article 9 establishes several different 
methods to perfect.  In most cases, the required method of perfecting a security 
interest is filing a financing statement.156  Article 9 allows perfection through 
other means,157 however, for certain types of collateral.  Those methods 
 
 
152
 Id. § 9-108 cmt. 5. 
 
153
 Perfecting a security interest does not guarantee that a creditor’s interest will be superior to all other 
interests.  For example, a creditor’s perfected security interest will be subordinate to another creditor’s 
perfected security interest if that other creditor filed its financing statement first.  Id. § 9-322(a)(1). 
 
154
 Id. §§ 9-317, 9-322.  “The security interests given priority under Section 9-322 and the other sections 
to which it refers take priority in general even over a perfected security interest. A fortiori they take priority 
over an unperfected security interest.”  Id. § 9-317 cmt. 3. 
 
155
 Id. § 9-308(a). 
 
156
 Id. § 9-310(a). 
 
157
 Id. § 9-310(b). 
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include automatic perfection,158 perfection by possession,159 and perfection by 
control.160  Because none of these additional methods apply to general 
intangibles or commercial tort claims, the only method to perfect in either case 
is by filing a financing statement.161 
To perfect by filing, the creditor must file a properly completed “financing 
statement”162 in the correct filing office, as determined by the law governing 
perfection of the particular type of collateral.  While some variations on where 
to file may exist, whether a form of intellectual property is characterized as a 
commercial tort claim or a general intangible will not have any impact on the 
method of perfecting by filing. 
First, the law governing perfection of general intangibles and commercial 
tort claims is determined by the location of the debtor.163  This is the default 
rule for most collateral,164 although there are exceptions.165  However, none of 
those exceptions apply to general intangibles or commercial tort claims.166  
Therefore, if the debtor is an individual, the law governing perfection for either 
of these types of collateral will be determined by the debtor’s principal 
residence.167 If the debtor is an organization, the law governing perfection will 
 
 
158
 Id. § 9-309.  This is also referred to as the “perfection-upon-attachment” rule.  Id. § 9-309 cmt. 2.  A 
purchase money security interest in consumer goods can be perfected this way.  Id. § 9-309(1). 
 
159
 Id. § 9-313.  Perfection by possession is permitted for tangible negotiable documents, goods, 
instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper.  Id. § 9-313(a). 
 
160
 Id. § 9-314.  Perfection by control is permitted for investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-
credit rights, or electronic chattel paper.  Id. § 9-314(a). 
 
161
 Cf. PETER F. COOGAN ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC § 19.01[2] (2005). 
 
162
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(39). 
 
163
 Id. § 9-301(1). 
 
164
 Id. § 9-301 cmt. 4 (“Paragraph (1) contains the general rule: the law governing perfection of security 
interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of 
the jurisdiction of the debtor’s location, as determined under Section 9-307.”). 
 
165
 Id. § 9-301 cmt. 5. 
The general rule is subject to several exceptions. It does not apply to goods covered by a certificate 
of title (see Section 9-303), deposit accounts (see Section 9-304), investment property (see Section 
9-305), or letter-of-credit rights (see Section 9-306). Nor does it apply to possessory security 
interests, i.e., security interests that the secured party has perfected by taking possession of the 
collateral (see paragraph (2)), security interests perfected by filing a fixture filing (see 
subparagraph (3)(A)), security interests in timber to be cut (subparagraph (3)(B)), or security 
interests in as-extracted collateral (see paragraph (4)). 
Id. 
 
166
 Id. 
 
167
 Id. § 9-307(b)(1). 
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be determined by its place of business168 or, if the organization has more than 
one place of business, the location of its chief executive office.169 
Second, the proper place to file a financing statement for either general 
intangibles or commercial tort claims is the filing office designated by the 
version of section 9-501170 that the state has adopted.  Generally it is the 
Secretary of State’s office.171 
Third, the creditor must complete a sufficient financing statement.  To be 
sufficient, the financing statement must provide the name of the debtor, the 
name of the creditor, and indicate the collateral covered.172  Because the 
Article 9 system for recording security interests is designed to provide notice 
of the possible existence of a security interest, and not to establish that security 
interest itself, very little information is required for a sufficient financing 
statement.173  As stated in the official comments, “[t]he notice itself indicates 
merely that a person may have a security interest in the collateral indicated.  
Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the 
complete state of affairs.”174 
Thus, unlike the security agreement, where a supergeneric description of 
collateral is insufficient,175 a financing statement is sufficient even if it merely 
describes the collateral as “all assets or all personal property.”176  If the 
creditor chooses to use a more specific listing of collateral, however, any asset 
not included in the description would not be perfected.177  Therefore, if the 
secured party describes the collateral as covering “general intangibles,” this 
would not suffice to perfect an interest in commercial tort claims. 
 
 
168
 Id. § 9-307(b)(2). 
 
169
 Id. § 9-307(b)(3). 
 
170
 Id. § 9-501. 
 
171
 Id. § 9-501(a) & legislative note.  Old Article 9 allowed a state to require local filing of financing 
statements.  However, local filing was eliminated in favor of a central filing system, except in limited cases 
such as real estate related collateral and transmitting utilities.  Id. § 9-501(a) cmt. 2. 
 
172
 Id. § 9-502(a). 
 
173
 Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2. 
 
174
 Id. 
 
175
 Id. § 9-108(c). 
 
176
 Id. § 9-504(2). 
 
177
 Id. § 9-504 cmt. 2 (“To comply with Section 9-502(a), a financing statement must ‘indicate’ the 
collateral it covers.”). 
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C. After-Acquired Property 
Whether a form of intellectual property is a general intangible or 
commercial tort claim will have a significant impact on whether a creditor can 
have a security interest in after-acquired intellectual property.  After-acquired 
property is property acquired by a debtor after the security interest has 
attached.  If there is a clause in the security agreement covering after-acquired 
property, such security interest will attach to future assets of the debtor upon 
acquisition.178  Of course, the security interest only attaches to those types of 
collateral described in the security agreement.  For example, the security 
agreement might describe the collateral as “all goods, now owned or hereafter 
acquired by the debtor.”  All goods acquired by the debtor after the effective 
date of the security agreement would be included as collateral. 
There are two types of collateral for which a security interest may not 
attach under an after-acquired property clause: consumer goods acquired more 
than ten days after the creditor gives value179 and commercial tort claims.180  
As explained in the official comments, “[i]n order for a security interest in a 
tort claim to attach, the claim must be in existence when the security 
agreement is authenticated.”181  What is meant by “in existence” is not 
explained in the comments to section 9-204.  However, the comments to 
section 9-108 state, under Section 9-204, “an after-acquired collateral clause in 
a security agreement will not reach future commercial tort claims. It follows 
that when an effective security agreement covering a commercial tort claim is 
entered into the claim already will exist.”182 
Thus, it seems clear that the facts sufficient to create liability under a 
commercial tort claim must have already occurred at the time the security 
agreement is executed.  Note, however, that the description of the commercial 
tort claim does not need to be very exact to be sufficient.183 
This limitation is not applicable to general intangibles; an after-acquired 
property clause covering general intangibles will create a security interest in 
 
 
178
 Id. § 9-204(a) cmt. 2. 
 
179
 Id. § 9-204(b)(1). 
 
180
 Id. § 9-204(b)(2). 
 
181
 Id. § 9-204 cmt. 4. 
 
182
 Id. § 9-108 cmt. 5. 
 
183
 See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements for an adequate 
description of a commercial tort. 
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any kind of general intangible.  Therefore, a creditor will clearly prefer that 
intellectual property be treated as a general intangible. 
D. Default Under Article 9 
If a debtor defaults under its agreement with the secured party,184 the 
secured party may enforce its security interest in accordance with the default 
provisions of Article 9.185  A secured party has the right to enforce its security 
interest using either the judicial procedures for foreclosure permitted in the 
jurisdiction186 or the self-help repossession powers available in Article 9.187 
Whether an intellectual property right is characterized as a general 
intangible or a commercial tort claim will have little bearing on the ability to 
repossesses the collateral.  Given that all intellectual property represents a form 
of intangible asset, the difficulties will be the same, because a secured party 
cannot physically possess, and thus cannot repossess, the collateral.188 
E. Bankruptcy 
As summarized by Professor Ward, 
[b]ankruptcy is a procedure within the structure of federal statutory 
law that provides the honest debtor with a discharge from existing 
debt in exchange for the orderly marshaling of the debtor’s assets and 
either the restructuring or the sale and division of those assets for the 
general benefit of creditors.189 
The full application of the Bankruptcy Code as it pertains to debtors that own 
intellectual property is beyond the scope of this Article.  Instead, this Article 
will focus on the strong arm powers of the trustee in a chapter 7 bankruptcy,190 
 
 
184
 “Default” is not defined in Article 9.  Instead, what constitutes a default is determined by agreement 
between the parties.  Id. § 9-601 cmt. 3. 
 
185
 Id. §§ 9-601 to 9-628. 
 
186
 Id. § 9-601(a). 
 
187
 Id. § 9-609. 
 
188
 See generally WARD, supra note 11, §§ 3:22-34 (discussing the issues relating to repossession of 
intellectual property under Article 9). 
 
189
 Id. § 4:1.  Professor Ward’s treatise discusses in detail the process and effect of filing for bankruptcy 
by a debtor that has intellectual property assets.  See id. §§ 4:1-136.  This article will only discuss the 
bankruptcy laws as they pertain to the effect of characterizing the collateral as a commercial tort. 
 
190
 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-728 (2000). 
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and the use of those powers by a debtor in possession filing for reorganization 
under chapter 11.191 
When the debtor files for bankruptcy, this immediately causes the creation 
of a bankruptcy estate.192  The estate includes almost all of the debtor’s legal 
and equitable interests in property,193 subject to certain limited exceptions.194  
Because this definition includes intangible property and the debtor’s claims 
against others, intellectual property195 and commercial tort claims are property 
of the estate.196 
Once the debtor has filed for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code 
immediately establishes an automatic stay.197  The automatic stay stops all 
collection activity by a secured party, including the commencement198 or 
continuation199 of an action to foreclose on the assets of the debtor and 
prohibiting the secured party from repossessing collateral.200 Notwithstanding 
the stay, a secured creditor can make a claim that it has a perfected security 
interest in the property of the debtor, and therefore should be granted relief 
from the stay in order to take possession and sell that property before the case 
is completed.201 
To avoid this, a debtor (or trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation) has two main 
options.  First, in a chapter 11 case the debtor can challenge the request for 
relief from the stay by arguing that such property is necessary for the 
 
 
191
 Id. §§ 1101-1146. 
 
192
 Id. § 541(a). 
 
193
 Id. § 541(a)(1). 
 
194
 Id. § 541(b). 
 
195
 Intellectual property is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as follows: “‘intellectual property’ means—
(A) trade secret; (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent application; (D) 
plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of 
title 17; to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.”  Id. § 101(35A). 
  Note that this definition does not include trademarks, moral rights, or other rights typically included in 
the broad category of intellectual property.  This has little significance for purposes of this Article, however, 
because the Bankruptcy Code definition of intellectual property applies only with respect to § 365(n), which 
deals with the right of the bankruptcy trustee to reject certain executory license agreements where the debtor is 
a licensor of such intellectual property.  Id. § 365(n). 
 
196
 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868 (“The scope of 
this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, [and] causes 
of action . . . .”). 
 
197
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
 
198
 Id. § 362(a)(1). 
 
199
 Id. § 362(a)(2). 
 
200
 Id. § 362(a)(3). 
 
201
 Id. § 362(d). 
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reorganization of the business.202  The bankruptcy court must conduct a 
hearing on the nature of the property and its value.  The court could grant relief 
from the stay, which would require the debtor to deliver the property to the 
secured borrower,203 or, if the court finds the property is necessary for the 
reorganization of the debtor, order the borrower to grant the secured lender 
adequate protection204 of the value of the secured party’s security interest, 
usually in the form of additional liens on other property.205 
The other possibility is for the trustee in a chapter 7 case, or the debtor as a 
debtor in possession in a chapter 11 reorganization,206 to challenge the validity 
of the secured party’s perfected security interest.  The trustee may do so 
because the trustee is deemed to be a hypothetical creditor whose lien attached 
to all of the property of the debtor at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.207  This hypothetical creditor status allows the trustee (and thus the 
debtor in possession) to avoid any security interest that would not have priority 
over a lien creditor, as of the filing date.208  Applying this rule to Article 9, if 
the secured party’s security interest is not perfected at the time of filing 
bankruptcy, or if the secured party has not filed a financing statement and 
obtained a security agreement, each adequately describing the collateral as of 
the date of filing, then the trustee would have priority over the secured 
creditor.209 
If an intellectual property right is properly characterized as a commercial 
tort, the trustee will be able to argue that under U.C.C. section 9-108, the 
description in the security agreement would have to describe the particular 
claim specifically in order for it to have attached and be perfected.210  If it has 
not, then the trustee would have priority under U.C.C. section 9-317(a)(2).  If 
so, the trustee could avoid the creditor’s security interest in the intellectual 
property,211 allowing the trustee to use and sell that intellectual property right 
for the benefit of the unsecured creditors in a chapter 7 liquidation.  Further, if 
 
 
202
 See id. § 362(d)(2)(B). 
 
203
 See id. § 362(d). 
 
204
 See id. § 362(d)(1). 
 
205
 Id. § 361(2). 
 
206
 Id. § 1107.  In general, the debtor may exercise the powers of the trustee in bankruptcy when acting as 
a debtor-in-possession.  Id. § 1107(a). 
 
207
 Id. § 544(a). 
 
208
 Id. § 544(b)(1). 
 
209
 U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) & (B) (2002). 
 
210
 See supra notes 141177 and accompanying text for a discussion of attachment and perfection of a 
security interest in a commercial tort. 
 
211
 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). 
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the intellectual property right is characterized as a commercial tort claim, it 
cannot cover any such rights acquired after  the effective date of the security 
interest, leaving all such intellectual property free of even an otherwise 
perfected security interest in commercial tort claims.212 
If the debtor is acting as a debtor in possession in a chapter 11 
reorganization, the debtor can make the same arguments.  Instead of the assets 
becoming available to the trustee to pay off the unsecured creditors, however, 
the debtor remains in possession of the intellectual property for use in the 
reorganization.213  Thus, the debtor retains control over the intellectual 
property without concern about having to surrender any intellectual property 
right to a secured creditor. 
III. MORAL RIGHTS AND STATE-BASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TRADE 
VALUES AS ASSETS IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
Numerous articles have been written about the issues surrounding the use 
of the primary forms of intellectual property rights as collateral (namely 
patents, trademarks, and copyrights).214 While there are thorny issues regarding 
the applicability of the Article 9 system for perfecting a security interest in 
such assets,215 they have been discussed by commentators216 and reviewed by 
the courts.217 In particular it is generally well settled that these assets are 
treated as general intangibles under Article 9.218  Thus, these assets are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
However, less attention has been paid to the use of secondary intellectual 
property rights in commercial transactions, such as moral rights or rights 
 
 
212
 See supra Part II.C. for a discussion of the after-acquired property rules applicable to commercial torts. 
 
213
 11 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 
 
214
 See generally Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral - Patents, Trade Secrets, 
Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 BUS. LAW 1567 (1981); Haemmerli, supra note 10; Ward, supra note 10. 
 
215
 For example, it has been held that priority and perfection for copyrights registered with the Copyright 
Office are determined under the Copyright Act.  See Nat’l Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Denver (In re Peregrine Entm’t, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 203–07 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).  However, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that where the copyrights have not yet been registered, the state Article 9 system of perfection 
and priority governs.  See Aerocon Eng’g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303 
F.3d 1120, 1126–31 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
216
 See, e.g., WARD, supra note 11, §§ 1:6-9; see also, PEB REPORT supra note 81, app. at 525–47. 
 
217
 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d at 1126–31. 
 
218
 See WARD, supra note 11, at §§ 1:6-9. 
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created under unfair competition law.219  This Article considers whether 
secondary forms of intellectual property, broadly defined as moral rights, 
should instead be classified as commercial tort claims. 
A. Moral Rights 
Under American law, protection for moral rights derives primarily from 
treaty obligations; however, there is some protection for limited forms of moral 
rights under state law.220  Moral rights are first and foremost a creation of the 
civil law system.221  Under continental European law, there exists special 
recognition of the rights of authors, which exceed the copyright law, referred 
to in France as the drôit moral.222  Moral rights are generally considered to 
have three aspects: the right of attribution, the right of integrity, and the right 
of withdrawal.223 
The right of attribution, or more fully, the right of attribution and paternity, 
is “the right of an author to receive credit as the author of a work, to prevent 
others from falsely being named [an] author, and to prevent use of the author’s 
name in connection with works the author did not create.”224 The right of 
integrity gives the author the right to prevent mutilation of the author’s 
work.225 Finally, the right of withdrawal gives the author the right to remove a 
work from distribution if “it no longer represents the views of the author.”226  
One of the key components of moral rights is that they are not assignable.  
Therefore, they must remain with the author.  An author may waive his or her 
moral rights in a particular work with respect to a particular person, but the 
 
 
219
 Although trademark law is commonly thought of as a subset of the law of unfair competition as well, 
nevertheless it is considered a primary form of intellectual property, and thus, outside the scope of this Article.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995). 
 
220
 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02[A] (1978); Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5–
16 (1985). 
 
221
 See Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995). 
 
222
 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  386 
(2d ed. 1995). 
 
223
 Id. 
 
224
 Id. 
 
225
 Id. 
 
226
 Id.  The Berne Convention Article 6bis does not require a country to adopt the right of withdrawal.  
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.01[B]. 
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author cannot generally transfer the rights of attribution, integrity, or 
withdrawal.227 
The Berne Convention, to which the United States adheres, requires that a 
signatory nation include moral rights.228  The United States did not adopt the 
Berne Convention as a self executing treaty; instead, the United States acceded 
to the treaty by adopting implementing legislation.229  In doing so, Congress 
initially made no changes to the copyright law to include any provisions for 
protection of moral rights.  Instead, Congress believed that the patchwork of 
state laws and section 43(a) to the Lanham Act provided equivalent protection 
to the formal moral rights required under Berne.230  Whether this complies with 
the requirements of Berne is disputed,231 especially since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.232 
However, Congress later adopted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
(“VARA”).233  VARA provides the moral rights of attribution and integrity to 
artists that produce limited-number works of visual arts.234  VARA is limited to 
 
 
227
 Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2023 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 17, 2000) (“It is undisputed by the parties that moral rights are inalienable and unassignable.”); WILLIAM 
F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 137 (1994); Kwall, supra note 220, at 5.  See generally STEPHEN P. 
LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY §§ 272-287 (1938); NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8.21[A], at 8-249; Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in 
the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 559–72 (1940). 
 
228
 International Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1896, art. 
6bis, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of said 
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which shall be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”)  Only the rights of attribution and integrity are required.  See NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 220 § 8D.01[B]. 
 
229
 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.02[C]. 
 
230
 Id. § 8D.02[D][1]; Kwall, supra note 220, at 17–33. 
 
231
 NIMME & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.02[D][1]. 
 
232
 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  In Dastar, the Court held that Lanham Act’s section 43(a) prohibition against 
false statement of origin relates to the origin of the manufacture of an item, not a requirement of attribution of 
the work to the original author. Id. at 36–38.  This puts earlier holdings such as Gilliam v. American 
Broadcasting Co’s., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), and Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981), often 
cited as examples of how moral rights are protected in the United States under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, into doubt. David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right 
Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 45 n.263 (2004). 
 
233
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  Congress did not enact VARA for the purposes of complying with Berne, 
although it was noted that the rights granted to visual artists under VARA were “analogous to those protected 
by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention . . . .” H.R. REP. 101-514, pt. I (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915. 
 
234
 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  A “work of visual art” is generally defined as a work consisting of no more than 
200 signed and consecutively numbered copies.  Id. § 101. 
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works of visual art, such as painting and sculpture.235  Despite this limited 
applicability of VARA, the rights protected under VARA represent the clearest 
example of protection of moral rights in the United States. 
Moral rights seem to represent the clearest example of intellectual property 
rights that should be treated as commercial torts under Article 9.  First, the 
rights of attribution and integrity as recognized under U.S. law are designed to 
protect the individual artist’s personal interests and professional reputation—
not to protect a right embodied in the work itself. In particular, the purpose of 
protecting moral rights is consistent with the concept of “arising in tort” as 
described in the Article 9 definition of commercial torts.  Protecting an artist’s 
interest in attribution and integrity conforms well with tort law’s concern with 
“(1) physical security and autonomy; (2) emotional security and other 
intangible interests such as privacy and reputation; and (3) economic security 
and opportunity.”236 
Second, due to the inability of an artist to assign his or her moral rights, 
such as under VARA,237 these rights lack an important aspect of a property 
right.  Although the right of attribution clearly grants the artist the right to 
“exclude” others from using the artist’s name without permission, this right to 
exclude is not alienable.  Therefore, moral rights do not fit the concept of an 
general intangible under Article 9.  Rather moral rights fit the concept of a 
commercial tort. 
B. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition238 
Unfair competition is often listed as a form of intellectual property right.  
However, the doctrine of unfair competition is more aptly described as the 
category of rights protecting against harm to one’s business from another’s 
unscrupulous business practices.239 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition divides the types of claims 
for unfair competition into three general categories: deceptive marketing, 
trademark infringement, and appropriation of intangible trade values.  In 
addition to those specific types of common law protections against unfair 
competition, the Restatement further includes a catch-all type of claim for “the 
 
 
235
 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 8D.06[A]. 
 
236
 DOBBS, supra note 87, § 1. 
 
237
 17 U.S.C.  § 106A(e)(1). 
 
238
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995). 
 
239
 Cf. id. § 1 cmt. 1. 
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acts or practices of the actor [which] are actionable by the other under federal 
or state statutes, international agreements, or general principles of common law 
apart from those considered in this Restatement.”240  As noted in the 
introduction, trademarks have been generally accepted as general intangibles, 
and are therefore outside the scope of this Article.  The following sections will 
analyze the claims that fall into the remaining sections of the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition, namely deceptive marketing and appropriation 
of intangible trade values, including misappropriation, trade secrets, and right 
of publicity. 
C. Deceptive Marketing 
1. Definition 
As explained by the Restatement: 
 Competitive markets cannot operate efficiently unless consumers 
have access to information about the goods and services offered by 
competing sellers. Much of the information available to prospective 
purchasers is provided by sellers in the form of advertising. If the 
message that it communicates is accurate, advertising can function as 
a convenient, low-cost source of information that assists consumers 
to choose intelligently among competing products. False or deceptive 
advertising, however, can result in improvident expenditures or force 
consumers to spend additional resources in an effort to acquire more 
reliable information.241 
The essence of a deceptive marketing claim is that a business has made 
representations about its goods or services which are likely to mislead or 
deceive potential customers.242  A competitor has a cognizable claim when 
such business’s representations are material to prospective purchasers’ conduct 
and it is reasonable to believe that this will cause a diversion of trade from, or 
harm to the goodwill of, such competitor.243  The claims can take the form of 
misrepresentations relating to source, in the form of passing off244 or reverse 
 
 
240
 Id. § 1(b). 
 
241
 Id. § 1 cmt. d. 
 
242
 Id. § 2. 
 
243
 Id. § 3. 
 
244
 Id. § 4. 
The misrepresentations that are proscribed by this Section cause prospective purchasers to believe 
that another person is associated with the actor or with the goods or services marketed by the actor, 
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passing off.245  Also included are misrepresentations, other than as to source, in 
marketing the goods or services of another that will cause harm to the product 
or manufacturer of the product.246 
The essence of the right against unfair competition is that a business has a 
legitimate commercial interest in the right to compete freely based on the 
merits of its product and the right to be free from harm to its goodwill or 
reputation.247  Thus, the right is that a business’s competitors will not 
misrepresent the nature or source of their own products.  This right does not 
include a cause of action by the business for misrepresentations as to the 
business’s products by its competitors.  Such an action would be brought under 
tort law as a product disparagement claim or trade libel under sections 623A to 
652 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.248  An action for deceptive 
marketing can be brought under either state law or under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.249 
In proving its case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s statements 
about its own products are likely to deceive or mislead “prospective 
purchasers.”250 Prospective purchaser is a broad concept that includes the 
defendant’s immediate customers, customers of its suppliers, and also 
professional buyers and purchasing agents of the defendant’s customers.251 
Those prospective purchasers have to be influenced in their purchasing 
decision in some material fashion—in a way that is likely to cause a “diversion 
 
thus placing the other’s reputation at risk and diverting to the actor the benefit of the other’s good 
will. 
Id. § 4 cmt. a. 
 
245
 Id. § 5.  “The misrepresentations of source that are the subject of this Section differ from those 
described in the preceding Section in that they result in the passing off, not of the actor’s goods as those of 
another, but of another’s goods as those of the actor.”  Id. § 5 cmt. a. 
 
246
 Id. § 6. 
This Section applies the general principle stated in § 2 to situations in which the representation 
relates to goods or services truthfully identified as originating from another. In the typical case, the 
misrepresentation concerns goods marketed under the other’s trademark, but the other’s 
association with the goods or services may also be communicated to prospective purchasers in any 
manner. 
Id. § 6 cmt. a. 
 
247
 Id. § 2 cmt. a. 
 
248
 Id. § 2 cmt. c (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A - 652). 
 
249
 Id. § 2 introductory note. 
 
250
 Id. § 2 cmt. d. 
 
251
 Id. 
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of trade” from, or harm to the good will of, the plaintiff.252  Statements that are 
mere puffery are not actionable.253 
2. False Advertising Vindicates the Interest a Business Suffers from the 
Loss of Sales or Harm to Its Goodwill 
The interest protected by the deceptive marketing cause of action under the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is directed towards preventing the 
diversion of sales to a competitor that misleads the public about the 
competitor’s own products or hurts the “business reputation or good will of 
another.”254  As noted in the comments to section 2, 
[t]he use of deceptive representations in the marketing of goods and 
services may also cause injury to the legitimate commercial interests 
of other sellers by unfairly depriving them of the opportunity to 
compete on the merits of their products in the marketplace or by 
threatening harm to their reputation and good will.255 
This interest is clearly co-relative; defined by the extent to which a 
competitor has misstated the facts about its products.  Until the competitor has 
done so, the business does not have a right to exclude the competitor.  All 
statements about the competitor’s products are protected, including puffery.  
Once the competitor’s statements rise to the level of a material misstatement 
about its product that is likely to influence consumers’ purchasing decisions, 
the business has a claim and the nature of its rights can be determined.256 
3. Right to Be Free of Deceptive Advertising Held Not a Property Right 
Although whether an intellectual property right is treated as a general 
intangible or commercial tort claim under Article 9 is not directly related to 
whether such right is treated as property, the issues are closely related.  To the 
extent that courts have held that an intellectual property right is not property, 
 
 
252
 Id. § 3. 
 
253
 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Mere puffing, 
advertising ‘that is not deceptive for no one would rely on its exaggerated claims,’ is not actionable under § 
43(a).”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3 cmt. d (1995). 
 
254
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3 cmt. f. 
 
255
 Id. § 2 cmt. a. 
 
256
 Id. § 3(a); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 
1990) (citing Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974)); U.S. Healthcare, 898 
F.2d at 922. 
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this supports the conclusion that it should be treated as a commercial tort claim 
under Article 9. 
The United States Supreme Court considered whether the right to be free 
from deceptive advertising is a property right recognized under Lanham Act 
section 43(a).  In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board,257 a New Jersey bank brought suit against the 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, an agency of the 
State of Florida, which marketed a prepaid tuition plan.  Specifically, College 
Savings Bank alleged that Florida Prepaid made material misstatements about 
Florida Prepaid’s savings program in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act.258  In order for the claim to survive, Florida’s sovereign immunity would 
have to have been abrogated under the Eleventh Amendment.259  College 
Savings Bank claimed that Congress had validly done so by enacting the 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act260 (“TRCA”) under Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment power to prevent states from depriving persons of their 
property without due process of law.261  College Savings described its property 
rights as follows: “(1) a right to be free from a business competitor’s false 
advertising about its own product, and (2) a more generalized right to be secure 
in one’s business interests.”262 
The Supreme Court stated that “[n]either of these qualifies as a property 
right protected by the Due Process Clause.”263  As to the first claimed property 
right, the court held that there was no property interest because there was no 
right to exclude others under a right to be free from false advertising.264  In 
particular “Florida Prepaid’s alleged misrepresentations concerning its own 
products intruded upon no interest over which petitioner had exclusive 
dominion.”265  Thus, there is no property interest in being free from unfair 
competition, as a general matter, at least with respect to the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court noted that the petitioner 
could not cite to any cases standing for such a proposition.266 
 
 
257
 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 
258
 Id. at 671. 
 
259
 Id. at 670–72.  College Savings Bank also argued that Florida waived its sovereign immunity.  Id. 
 
260
 Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 
261
 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 672. 
 
262
 Id. 
 
263
 Id. 
 
264
 Id. at 673. 
 
265
 Id. 
 
266
 Id. 
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As to the second claimed property interest, the Supreme Court held that 
although there were property rights in the assets of a business, such as its 
goodwill, there was no property interest in the right to conduct a business.267 
The Court reasoned that “business in the sense of the activity of doing 
business, or the activity of making a profit is not property in the ordinary 
sense—and it is only that, and not any business asset, which is impinged upon 
by a competitor’s false advertising.”268 
Although not directly related to the issue of how a claim of false 
advertising should be handled under Article 9, the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Florida Prepaid is illustrative of the fact that a claim of unfair competition 
is in the nature of a personal claim, which should be treated as a commercial 
tort rather than a general intangible. 
4. A False Advertising Claim is Generally Not Alienable 
The tort of unfair competition is commonly cited as an example of the kind 
of rights that are non-assignable.269  Such a right is deemed to be personal in 
nature, and thus should not be assignable.270 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition makes no statement with regard to the assignment of such claims, 
but since it is an expansion of the false advertising rules contained in section 
761 of the Restatement of Torts, presumably the same reasoning would 
apply.271  Thus, given that a claim for deceptive advertising is generally treated 
as personal in nature, and not usually alienable, it should be a commercial tort 
claim and not a general intangible. 
D. Appropriation of Trade Values 
1. General Principles 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition rejects the general 
recognition of exclusive rights in intangible trade values, instead adopting a 
 
 
267
 Id. at 675. 
 
268
 Id. 
 
269
 See, e.g., Horton v. New S. Ins. Co., 468 S.E.2d 856, 858 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Vinson & Elkins v. 
Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 396 (Tex. App. 1997) (explaining that Texas law assumes that causes of action are 
generally assignable, however, no assignment of a claim of a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is 
permitted for policy reasons); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 53 (2004). 
 
270
 Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 413 S.E.2d 268, 271–72 (N.C. 1992); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 53 
(2004). 
 
271
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 reporters’ note (1995). 
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general right to copy that is subject to a series of specified exceptions.272  The 
general rule is stated as follows: 
One who causes harm to the commercial relations of another by 
appropriating the other’s intangible trade values is subject to liability 
to the other for such harm only if: 
(a) the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the 
other’s trade secret under the rules stated in §§ 39-45; or 
(b) the actor is subject to liability for an appropriation of the 
commercial value of the other’s identity under the rules stated 
in §§ 46-49; or 
(c) the appropriation is actionable by the other under federal or 
state statutes or international agreements, or is actionable as a 
breach of contract, or as an infringement of common law 
copyright as preserved under federal copyright law.273 
The emphasis in the general rule is that there should be no liability for a 
competitor in using the intangible trade values of another unless there has been 
a misappropriation of that trade value.  This emphasis on misappropriation 
sounds in tort, much as the right to be free from deceptive advertising does, as 
discussed above.  Assuming this is true, this leaves some room to argue that 
some intellectual property “assets” are best treated as commercial torts under 
Article 9 rather than general intangibles. 
2. Trade Secrets 
(a) Information Protected as Secret 
(i) Definition of Trade Secret 
Trade secret protection is generally a creature of state law.  While certain 
federal statutes create criminal liability for theft of trade secrets,274 trade 
secrets are primarily protected under state civil law.275  There are three main 
formulations for protecting trade secrets under state law—one is statutory and 
the other two are common law.  First, legislation can protect trade secrets, 
 
 
272
 Id. § 38 intro. note to ch. 4. 
 
273
 Id. § 38. 
 
274
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000) (mail fraud); Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 
(2000); National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000). 
 
275
 See, e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case For A Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
427, 435 (1995) (“[T]he [state law] trade secret misappropriation tort fills a significant gap in the federal law 
of intellectual property by enabling companies to safeguard their valuable but non-patentable innovations.”). 
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usually in some form of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”).276  So far, 
forty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted some version of the 
UTSA.277  Second, trade secrets are protected under section 757 of the original 
Restatement of Torts.278  While liability for misappropriation of trade secrets 
was removed from the Restatement (Second) of Torts,279 courts often rely upon 
the definition of a trade secret from the first Restatement.280  Third, trade 
secrets are protected under the more recent Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition.281  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is the modern 
restatement of the common law protection of a trade secret.282 
Although the definition of “trade secret” under each of these formulations 
is slightly different,283 the effect of each is to cover the same type of 
 
 
276
 Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433–67 (1990). 
 
277
 Id. at refs. & annots. 
 
278
 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 
279
 The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts felt that: 
the law of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation is no more dependent upon Tort law than it is 
on many other general fields of the law and upon broad statutory developments, particularly at the 
federal level. The Council formally reached the decision that these chapters no longer belong in the 
Restatement of Torts, and they are omitted from this Second Restatement. If it should be later 
decided that the law on these subjects ought to be restated, it will be done by separate restatements 
on the subjects involved. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, introductory note to div. 9 (1977). 
 
280
 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.01[2]. 
 
281
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
 
282
 Id. reporters’ note (also noting the applicability of the Restatement to UTSA cases). 
 
283
 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows: 
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy. 
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). 
  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also defines trade secrets as “any information that can 
be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford 
an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 39. 
  Trade secret is also defined in the comments to section 757 of the first Restatement of Torts.  “A trade 
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s 
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use 
it.”  RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
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information.284  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has the most 
succinct definition of the three: “A trade secret is any information that can be 
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently 
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over 
others.”285 
Almost any information can be a trade secret under this definition if it is 
valuable and secret.  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition does not 
require that the information be contained in written form, if it can be 
sufficiently defined.286 In fact, a trade secret can consist of the information 
gained by employees in the process of performing their duties for their 
employer.287  Thus, a trade secret can consist of transitory, ephemeral 
information that is never recorded.288 
Trade secret law does not create an exclusive right in information as such, 
but rather protects certain information that is subject to reasonable efforts to 
maintain its secrecy.289  This means that the owner of the information needs to 
take certain steps to ensure that the information does not become generally 
known to the public or to those in their industry.290 For example, the 
information should not be disclosed to too many people291 and should be 
 
 
284
 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.01[2][a].  One 
difference between the definition of trade secrets contained in the UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition on the one hand, and the definition in the Restatement of Torts section 757, is that section 757 
states that information of short duration should not be protected as a trade secret, whereas the UTSA and 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition contain no such restriction.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. 
 
285
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d.  The drafters of the Restatement 
intended this to be consistent with the definition of trade secrets under the UTSA.  Id. cmt. b. 
 
286
 Id. § 39 cmt. d (“[t]here is no requirement that the information be incorporated or embodied in a 
tangible form if it is otherwise sufficiently delineated.”). 
 
287
 Id. § 42 cmt. e.  If the trade secret is developed in the course of the employee’s normal duties for the 
employer, then the employer would own such trade secrets, even if the employee used the employee’s own 
knowledge and skill to develop the trade secrets.  Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397). 
 
288
 Id. § 39 cmt. d.  This comment specifically distinguishes the modern rule from that stated in the first 
Restatement of Torts, which did deny protection for information of short duration.  See RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (“[A trade secret] differs from other secret information in a business (see § 759) in that it 
is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business . . . .  A trade secret is 
a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business.”). 
 
289
 The term “secret” is used in the definition of trade secret in all three formulations.  Unif. Trade Secrets 
Act § 1(4); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. 
 
290
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (“Information known by persons in 
addition to the trade secret owner can retain its status as a trade secret if it remains secret from others to whom 
it has potential economic value.”); MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.05. 
 
291
 Id. § 39 cmt. g; see also id. cmt. f, reporters’ note (“[t]he precautions required of the trade secret owner 
may increase with increasing dissemination.”). 
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disclosed in confidence.  Limited disclosure, even without a duty of 
confidence, may not destroy the trade secret if the information is nevertheless 
kept secret.292 Also, for those not subject to an implied duty of confidentiality, 
the owner should have non-disclosure agreements with those that receive the 
information.  If the owner does not take these steps, the owner will not have a 
trade secret protected under the law. 
Even if the owner has taken all reasonable means to keep the information 
secret, it may nevertheless become generally known.  If it does, there is 
nothing that the owner can do to recapture the trade secret.293  Therefore, 
information otherwise protectable under trade secret law may be freely 
available to all once it loses its confidential status and all exclusive rights will 
disappear.294  This also means that whether information will be protected under 
trade secret law requires litigation to prove that the information was, and 
remains, secret at the time of the litigation.295  The owner will have the burden 
to prove that it owns a trade secret.296 
(ii) Duty of Confidence 
Information is protected under trade secret law where there is a duty to 
keep that information secret.  That obligation is created either by 
implication,297 as through the duty of loyalty imposed on employees,298 or 
expressly by contract.299 
 
 
292
 Id. § 39 cmt. f. 
 
293
 Id. (“If the information has become readily ascertainable from public sources so that no significant 
benefit accrues to a person who relies instead on other means of acquisition, the information is in the public 
domain and no longer protectable under the law of trade secrets.”); see also MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 1.03; 2 
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR. & MONO. § 14:27 (4th ed. 2005). 
 
294
 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (“While the court is persuaded by the [Church of Scientology’s] evidence that those who 
made the original postings likely gained the information through improper means, as no one outside the 
Church or without a duty of confidence would have had access to those works, this does not negate the finding 
that, once posted, the works lost their secrecy.”) (citations omitted); see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS 
§ 4.04[3][f] (2004).  DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
295
 See MILGRIM, supra note 13, §§ 15.01-.02. 
 
296
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION  § 39 cmt. d. 
 
297
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41(b); MILGRIM, supra note 13, §3.01. 
 
298
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42; MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 5.02[1] (“The 
relationship between an employer and an employee is a confidential one. The existence of such relationship 
between employer and employee imposes a duty upon the employee not to use or disclose the employer’s 
confidential information to the employer’s detriment.”). 
 
299
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41(a) (1995); MILGRIM, supra note 13, §4.01. 
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(iii)  Misappropriation of Trade Secrets 
What is prohibited by the UTSA, as well as the Restatements, is the 
misappropriation of trade secrets.300  Unlike other forms of intellectual 
property law that grant the owner exclusive rights in the underlying invention 
or original expression, such as patent and copyright law, trade secret law does 
not create a right in the information itself.301  Instead, trade secret law prohibits 
the appropriation of that information by improper means.302  Thus, while a 
patent owner may prohibit the use of the patented technology regardless of 
how the infringer came by the technology, and regardless of fault, a trade 
secret owner may only obtain a remedy where the alleged infringer has 
obtained or disclosed secret information in an improper manner.  If the alleged 
infringer independently discovers the information, or obtains the information 
by examining publicly available products and information, then the alleged 
infringer cannot be found liable.303 
Misappropriation is defined under the UTSA as 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or 
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper 
means; or 
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or 
implied consent by a person who 
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade 
secret; or 
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to 
know that his knowledge of the trade secret was 
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized 
improper means to acquire it; 
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty 
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty 
to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or 
limit its use; or 
 
 
300
 Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 2, 3, 14 U.L.A. (1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 40; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
 
301
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c. 
 
302
 Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 2, 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40; RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. 
 
303
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43. 
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(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or 
had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that 
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.304 
This definition leaves someone free to obtain otherwise secret information 
and to use it for a benefit without fear of liability if the information was not 
obtained inappropriately.305  As stated in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, “[i]ndependent discovery and analysis of publicly available 
products or information are not improper means of acquisition.”306  For 
example, it is legal to purchase a competitor’s product and reverse engineer it 
to determine any trade secret information.307  The Restatement provides the 
following example: 
A sells a drug compounded from a secret formula. B, a competing 
drug manufacturer, purchases a quantity of A’s drug on the open 
market and learns the formula through scientific analysis. B then 
begins to market a similar product. B has not acquired A’s trade 
secret by improper means.308 
(b) Protection of Confidential Relationships 
The limitation of trade secret protection to misappropriation of trade secrets 
has led some to argue that this form of intellectual property is directed more to 
protecting certain confidential relationships rather than creating a property 
right in the particular secret information.309  Professor Thomas Ward points 
out, “trade secrets [can be seen] as no more than the amalgam of rights and 
duties that arise between discrete persons under contract law, tort law, and trust 
law, rather than a right in some ‘thing’ that can be asserted against the 
world.”310 
 
 
304
 Unif. Trade Secrets Act §1(2). 
 
305
 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) (“The public at 
large remain[s] free to discover and exploit the trade secret through reverse engineering of products in the 
public domain or by independent creation.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. a 
(“The owner of a trade secret does not have an exclusive right to possession or use of the secret information. 
Protection is available only against a wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure of the trade secret.”). 
 
306
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43. 
 
307
 Id. § 43 cmt. b. 
 
308
 Id. § 43 cmt. b, illus. 1. 
 
309
 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 
CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998) (“[T]rade secret law is merely a collection of other legal norms—contract, fraud, 
and the like—united only by the fact that they are used to protect secret information.”). 
 
310
 WARD, supra note 11, § 1:11. 
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The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition claims, in the comments to 
section 39, that one interest of the early trade secrets cases was to enforce a 
level of ethical behavior and fair competition in the business environment.311  
This goal includes imposing upon those with knowledge of certain confidential 
information a duty to keep that information secret.312  By enforcing a code of 
conduct on certain legal relationships, the Restatement encourages the 
dissemination of secret information in limited circumstances and the use of 
confidential information in an efficient manner.  For example, by imposing a 
general duty of confidentiality upon employees, an employer can safely 
disclose secret information to help an employee in her job, further developing 
the employer’s business.313 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition notes in the discussion of 
the development of trade secret doctrine, however, that a property analysis of 
trade secrets was needed in order to obtain injunctive relief.314  Even so, many 
early cases “concluded that the essence of a trade secret action is a breach of 
confidence or other improper conduct, sometimes explicitly disavowing any 
property dimension to a trade secret.”315  In particular, the Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition notes that the first Restatement of Torts, section 757, 
specifically rejected the property theory of trade secrets: “The influential 
formulation in section 757 of the Restatement of Torts (1939), reporting that 
the property conception ‘has been frequently advanced and rejected,’ 
concluded that the prevailing theory of liability rests on ‘a general duty of good 
faith.’”316 
Milgrim argues that such intellectual analysis of the nature of trade secrets 
is subject to “a certain opaqueness.”317  In his view, it is clear that a trade 
secret is property and the property rights in a trade secret are the rights “to use 
and disclose it to others subject to restrictions on their use and disclosure.”318  
He compares the property right to that of a copyright, and the discussion of the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition as “a cascade of underanalyzed 
 
 
311
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a. 
 
312
 Id. § 41. 
 
313
 Id. § 39 cmt. a (“The rules protecting trade secrets also promote the efficient exploitation of knowledge 
by discouraging the unproductive hoarding of useful information and facilitating disclosure to employees, 
agents, licensees, and others who can assist in its productive use.”). 
 
314
 Id. § 39 cmt. b. 
 
315
 Id. 
 
316
 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939)). 
 
317
 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 2.01. 
 
318
 Id. 
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notions.”319 Milgrim strongly believes that this discussion has created “more 
conceptual heat than light,”320 in no small part because courts have generally 
accepted that trade secrets are a form of property.321  Other reasons supporting 
the property view of trade secrets, according to Milgrim, are that trade secrets 
are assignable,322 have been accepted as property contributed in exchange for a 
stock issuance,323 may be the subject of a trust,324 may pass by will or intestate 
succession,325 and may be property of a bankruptcy estate.326 
(c) Trade Secret Most Likely General Intangible, but . . . 
In applying the two part test to trade secrets, it is easiest to start with the 
second question: Is a trade secret assignable?  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the answer is clearly yes.327  While there may be 
issues relating to the right of the assignor to keep328 or to further assign329 a 
trade secret, nevertheless the law recognizes the transfer of the trade secret 
from one party to another party.330  Therefore, in applying the two part test, the 
question of assignability falls squarely on the side of characterizing a trade 
secret as a general intangible. 
With respect to the first question, whether trade secret law vindicates an 
interest in the owner ancillary to the underlying secret information,  the answer 
is less clear.  Obviously, many trade secrets have enormous intrinsic value 
apart from the identity of the owner.  The secret formula to the Coca-Cola soft 
drink is a prime example.  Such trade secrets are easily reducible to tangible 
form,  clearly exist apart from their creators, and can be transferred to and 
owned by someone wholly unrelated to the original creator.  In this way, a 
 
 
319
 Id. (“Thus, comment b emits a cascade of underanalyzed notions to the effect that courts protect trade 
secrets sometimes under property theories, sometimes under breach of good faith theories and sometimes 
under general prohibition against unfair methods of competition.”). 
 
320
 Id. 
 
321
 Id. § 2.01 n.15. 
 
322
 Id. § 2.02. 
 
323
 Id. § 2.03. 
 
324
 Id. § 2.04. 
 
325
 Id. § 2.05 (Milgrim concedes that a trade secret “does not lend itself to such transmission as readily as 
other forms of property.”). 
 
326
 Id. § 2.06.  The Bankruptcy Code includes trade secret in its definition of intellectual property.  
11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)(A) (2000). 
 
327
 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (holding trade secrets are assignable); see 
also Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 
328
 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 2.02[1]. 
 
329
 Id. § 2.02[2]. 
 
330
 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002; Milgrim, supra note 13, §2.02. 
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trade secret appears to be a form of intellectual property that exhibits many of 
the characteristics of intangible personal property which should be treated as a 
general intangible. Roger Milgrim describes the property right as follows: 
“Quite simply, it is the right of the owner of the trade secret to use and disclose 
it to others subject to restrictions on their use and disclosure.”331 
Nevertheless, a trade secret is a form of intangible property that has several 
characteristics that distinguish it from the primary forms of intellectual 
property. Whether a trade secret is a form of property is not the controlling 
issue in deciding whether to characterize it as a general intangible or 
commercial tort. Even accepting Milgrim’s persuasive argument that a trade 
secret is property,332 it is a less absolute form of property.  In particular, 
comparing the nature of  trade secrets as property to patents, trademarks, and 
copyrights points out some of the distinct differences between trade secrets 
compared to those primary forms of intellectual property.  These differences 
suggest that perhaps some trade secrets may be better analyzed as commercial 
torts rather than general intangibles under Article 9. 
First, unlike a patent, trademark, or copyright, whether a person owns a 
trade secret can never be determined from publicly available facts.  Certainly, a 
person may publicly claim to have a trade secret, but that assertion can never 
amount to more than a claim, because the act of publicly proving its existence 
destroys it.333  By comparison, patents and trademarks are easily determined by 
a review of publicly available facts.334  Copyrights are a little more difficult 
because one must separate out the copyrightable original expression;335 
nevertheless, such expression is commonly publicly available. 
Second, it is not possible to create a registration system for trade secrets 
because any public registration of the nature of a trade secret would destroy its 
existence. By contrast, a patent only exists once the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) has issued the patent.336  Trademarks and copyrights, while not 
 
 
331
 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 2.01. 
 
332
 See supra notes 317–326 and accompanying text. 
 
333
 See supra notes 289–96 and accompanying text regarding the requirement of secrecy for a trade secret. 
 
334
 Searches of issued patents and certain pending patent applications, as well as trademark registrations 
and all pending trademark applications, can be made at the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
website.  See http://www.uspto.gov.  Further, there are private trademark searching agencies. 
 
335
 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 220, § 2.01. 
 
336
 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). Generally, pending patent applications are kept confidential until publication 
of the application eighteen months after filing, 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) – (b), although publication destroys any 
trade secrets contained in the application, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c (1995) 
SMITHGALLEYFINAL 1/31/2006  12:28 PM 
142 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22 
requiring registration for their existence, can be, and often are, registered.337  
Thus the three primary forms of intellectual property have registration systems, 
that provide public notice of their existence and the scope of protection. 
Third, in all cases, a party claiming to own a trade secret carries the burden 
of sufficiently defining what information is claimed as secret338  as well as 
proving that the owner used reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.339  With 
patents, trademarks, and copyrights, registration creates a presumption of 
validity.340 
Finally, trade secrets do not grant the owner the general power to exclude 
others from utilizing the information to the benefit of the owner’s business, 
which most forms of intellectual property grant.  Instead, a trade secret 
“merely limits the means by which others are free to appropriate the ‘things’ 
that satisfy the definition of a ‘secret.’”341  There must be an illegal act, the 
misappropriation of the information, that precedes the power to prevent the use 
of the information.  That is to say, the trade secret right is not a right as against 
the world, but only against those under a duty to maintain the secrecy of the 
information contained in the trade secret.  In this regard, it is much more of a 
tort right than a traditional property right. 
By comparison, the primary forms of intellectual property include the 
exclusive rights over the subject matter as against the world, regardless of 
fault.  A patent grants the owner the power to prevent anyone from making, 
using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the invention.342  Fault is not an 
element of a patent infringement claim—a patent owner may prevent 
infringement even by an innocent infringer.343  Nor is fault required for 
 
(“Thus, for matter disclosed in the patent, issuance terminates the secrecy required for continued protection as 
a trade secret, even if the patent is subsequently declared invalid.”). 
 
337
 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) (trademarks may be registered with the PTO); 17 U.S.C. §§ 409, 410 (2000) 
(copyrights may be registered with the Copyright Office); MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 22.10 (there are also 
state registration statutes). 
 
338
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d. 
 
339
 Id. § 40 cmt. a. 
 
340
 15 U.S.C. § 1057 (certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of validity of registered 
trademark); 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (registration of copyright within five years of publication constitutes prima 
facie evidence of validity); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (patent presumed valid). 
 
341
 See WARD, supra note 11, § 1:11. 
 
342
 17 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 
343
 Id.; JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 4 PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 20:4 (2d ed. 2005) (“There is no 
intent element to direct infringement. It is immaterial whether the manufacturer knew or was ignorant of the 
fact that the article as made and sold infringed the patent.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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trademark infringement.344  All that is required to prove trademark 
infringement is that the use of a mark is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or 
deception.345  A copyright owner is specifically granted several enumerated 
exclusive rights to a copyright, including the rights to make copies, prepare 
derivative works, and distribute copies.346  Violating any of these exclusive 
rights creates liability for copyright infringement, regardless of the intent of the 
actor.347 
Further, does it make sense to call something a general intangible if we 
have to litigate whether it even exists348 or if its existence can evaporate 
without any misfeasance by the putative trade secret owner?349  If the critics of 
the property view are correct, the right exists to protect confidential 
relationships, and so can be said to vindicate the interest in the holder of the 
right to be free from having those under a duty of confidentiality from 
disclosing what they know.  There is certainly an argument for this point of 
view.  Of necessity, there is no public database of the information that is secret.  
The trade secret property can easily evaporate if the information is publicly 
disclosed, regardless of how it is disclosed.  As a result, it is difficult to know 
whether there is any property at all. 
Perhaps a distinction should be made between those trade secrets that have 
been reduced to tangible form and those that represent the more ephemeral 
types of trade secrets.  For example, a pending patent application that has not 
yet been published may contain trade secrets, at least until it is published.350  
The patent application must contain a full written description of the 
invention,351 including the best mode of practicing the invention,352 and so 
 
 
344
 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 23:124 (“A mistaken, good faith belief will not excuse otherwise illegal 
infringement . . . .”). 
 
345
 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (infringement of a registered mark); § 1127(a)(1)(A) (infringement of 
unregistered mark). 
 
346
 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 
347
 Id. § 501.  If the infringement is willful, the copyright owner may be able to obtain enhanced statutory 
damages of up to $150,000.  Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 
348
 See MILGRIM, supra note 13, §1.03 (“Fundamentally, existence of a trade secret is a question of fact 
for determination by the trier of fact, secrecy being a basic element of any claimed trade secret.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 
349
 See id. (“However, a discoverer of a trade secret may forfeit protection if the entire combination of its 
aspects is disclosed in several publications.”). 
 
350
 Patent applications are initially kept confidential.  35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2000).  Although there is now a 
presumption that applications should be published eighteen months after the date of filing, id. § 122(b)(1)(A), 
nevertheless there are certain exceptions to this presumption, such as where an applicant requests that it not be 
published and the applicant has not filed the application in any other country, id. § 122(b)(2)(B). 
 
351
 Id. § 112 (requirements for specification). 
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likely represents a clear example of a trade secret that has been reduced to a 
tangible form.  Patent applications may be assigned,353 and so represent a form 
of trade secret that should be treated as a general intangible.  If a trade secret 
embodies information that is clearly reduced to tangible, written form in the 
nature of a patent application, and can easily be assigned as with a patent 
application, then it should be treated as a general intangible. 
However, where the trade secret is ephemeral or represents knowledge 
known by certain employees but not reduced to tangible form, the trade secret 
is more properly characterized as a commercial tort.  This is markedly so 
where “[t]he rules governing liability for the appropriation of trade secrets play 
a more central role in regulating the behavior of employees after the 
termination of the employment relationship.”354 According to Milgrim, “[t]he 
great majority of reported trade secret cases arise in the context of the 
employer-employee relationship.”355  As he points out, aggressive enforcement 
of trade secret protection runs the risk of preventing an employee with trade 
secret knowledge from pursuing the employee’s livelihood in a meaningful 
way.356  While courts have recognized the right of an employer to protect the 
valuable trade secrets known by former employees,357 this protection is 
counterbalanced by the recognition of a worker’s right to use the skills and 
experience the worker gained while working for a former employer.358 
Certain legal doctrines, such as the inevitable disclosure doctrine,359 or the 
doctrine that where an employee is specifically hired to create inventions for 
the  employer, the employer owns the trade secret,360 exist to protect employers 
from having their former employees disclose trade secrets to their new 
employers.  In such situations, however, the former employer will often have 
an added burden beyond merely showing that a protectable trade secret 
exists.361  An employer may be expected to show additional facts, for example, 
an employee having knowledge of specialized information about the employer, 
 
 
352
 Id. 
 
353
 Id. § 261. 
 
354
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. b (1995). 
 
355
 MILGRIM, supra note 13, § 5.01. 
 
356
 Id. 
 
357
 Id. § 5.02[2]. 
 
358
 Id. § 5.02[3][a]. 
 
359
 Id. § 5.02[3][d]. 
 
360
 Id. § 5.02[4][a]. 
 
361
 Id. § 5.02[3][c] (“On the other hand, where there is no restrictive covenant, the plaintiff-employer of 
such a previously skilled employee may have the burden of carefully identifying its trade secret and isolating it 
from the defendant ex-employee’s prior and job-enhanced skills.”). 
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the inability of competitors to develop the information themselves, or the 
former employee absconding with some tangible form of the information.362 
In such circumstances, a highly fact-based analysis of the existence of the 
trade secret, the relative rights and duties of the parties, and the public policy 
considerations such as an employee’s right to practice a trade, will likely be 
necessary.  Therefore, where protection of a trade secret involves 
considerations, relating to the particular nature of the relationship between the 
parties, trade secret law is more focused on issues ancillary to protecting the 
underlying secret information.  In such a case, perhaps the trade secret is more 
properly characterized as a commercial tort. 
This characterization makes sense given the circumstances in which a 
lender would come to own a trade secret.  If a borrower defaults because the 
business is failing, many employees, particularly technically skilled workers, 
will likely leave to work for competitors in the same industry.  Assuming the 
borrower granted a security interest in collateral, including general intangibles 
(including after acquired collateral), the secured party will likely repossess the 
general intangibles when it repossesses the assets of the borrower.  If all trade 
secrets are defined as general intangibles, the secured party would in effect 
have a right to the trade secrets contained in the minds of the former 
employees, granting the bank—or someone who buys the general intangibles 
in a sale of the collateral—a right to sue those former employees to prevent the 
disclosure of the trade secrets to their new employers.  Apart from the 
difficulty in proving such a case, the lender would be suing the former 
employees of the now defunct business and preventing them from pursuing 
their trade. 
If the borrower instead files a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, many of 
those same employees would remain employed by the borrower.  Here, the 
situation is even more remarkable.  Such trade secrets would be property of the 
estate363 and subject to the automatic stay.364  The secured lender would 
initially be prohibited from repossessing the trade secrets.365  However, a 
secured lender would be able to make a claim that it has a perfected security 
interest in the trade secret knowledge of the current employees and could 
request relief from the automatic stay in order to take possession and sell those 
 
 
362
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995). 
 
363
 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000). 
 
364
 Id. § 362(a). 
 
365
 Id. § 362(a)(3). 
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secrets.366  While the borrower could likely make a cogent argument that such 
trade secrets are necessary for the reorganization of the business,367 the 
bankruptcy court would have to hold a hearing on the nature of the trade 
secrets and their value.368  The court could grant relief from the stay, which 
would allow the creditor to foreclose on the borrower’s trade secrets.369  More 
likely, the court will find the trade secrets necessary for the reorganization of 
the debtor and order the borrower to grant the secured lender adequate 
protection370 to maintain the value of the secured party’s security interest, often 
in the form of additional liens on other property.371 
In either of these scenarios, the interests of the employees and the borrower  
are better protected by characterizing the trade secret knowledge as a 
commercial tort, requiring that it be described with specificity in the security 
agreement, and preventing the creation of a lien on after acquired trade secret 
knowledge. 
3. Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity has been described by one commentator as the right 
of a person to control the use of his or her persona for commercial purposes.372  
The right of publicity had its genesis in the right of privacy,373 which in turn 
developed out of an influential article written by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, entitled The Right of Privacy.374  The right of privacy was further 
refined into four separate torts in an article by William Prosser,375 which were 
then included in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.376 
 
 
366
 Id. § 362(d). 
 
367
 Id. § 362(d)(2)(B). 
 
368
 Id. § 362(d); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 361.04, 362.08 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 15th ed. 1996) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY]. 
 
369
 11 U.S.C. § 362(f); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 368, ¶ 362.07. 
 
370
 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). 
 
371
 Id. § 361(2); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 368, ¶ 361.03[3]. 
 
372
 MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 46, at 528; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
 
373
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (“The principal historical antecedent of 
the right of publicity is the right of privacy.”). 
 
374
 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 
375
 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 
376
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I (1977).  The Restatement built upon the 
scholarly work of William Prosser, who described the right of privacy incorporating four torts: “unreasonable 
intrusions upon another’s seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, publicity placing another in a false light, 
and the appropriation for the defendant’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (citing Prosser, supra note 375). 
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The right of publicity generally refers to the use of a person’s name or 
likeness, although the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also 
prohibits the appropriation of “other indicia of identity,”377 which may include 
use or imitation of a person’s voice or other identifying features.378  The right 
of publicity is recognized in half the states, either by statute or common law.379 
The right of publicity, as currently understood, derived from the specific 
privacy tort described as the “appropriation” tort.380  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts states, “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy.”381  However, the privacy appropriation tort protects the plaintiff 
against harm to both personal and commercial interests when the plaintiff’s 
identity has been exploited by a third party without permission.382 
Because the right of publicity is only recognized in half of the states, in the 
other half of the states, presumably, there is no general intangible publicity 
right that may function as collateral under Article 9.383  Instead, a person 
attempting to grant a security interest in the right to be free from use of his or 
her identity in commerce without permission would be relying on the privacy 
tort.  As a result, a secured party would likely have to perfect the right 
according to the commercial tort rules, if at all.  It is also likely that a celebrity 
would meet the requirement that the appropriation tort be a commercial tort 
because the tort arises by definition “in the course of the claimant’s business or 
profession.”384  However, because of the difficulty in pledging commercial 
torts, this, of course, makes the right that much less valuable an asset for an 
individual. 
 
 
377
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46. 
 
378
 Id. § 46 cmt. d. (the use of voice or “performing persona” may create liability). 
 
379
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 6.1. 
 
380
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b; see also Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1328-32 (2002) (discussing the development of the right of publicity). 
 
381
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 
382
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION  § 46 cmt. b. 
 
383
 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1335 (“For the debtor-creditor system to recognize 
publicity rights and treat them as assets, those rights would have to exist in the applicable jurisdiction. 
Currently it is unclear how many states do, or probably would, recognize an alienable property interest in the 
human persona.”).  The Jacoby & Zimmerman article primarily focuses on whether the right of publicity 
should be treated as property of the estate in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case and not whether such right should be 
treated as a general intangible under Article 9.  Id. at 1342–43. 
 
384
 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13)(B)(i) (2000). 
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(a) Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person’s Identity: The 
Right of Publicity 
In the leading treatise on the right of publicity, Professor McCarthy states 
that the right of publicity should be treated as any other property right which 
may be sold or licensed.385  It is Professor McCarthy’s belief that a right of 
publicity should be fully assignable, and thus alienable to a third party.386  This 
allows the celebrity to maximize the value of the celebrity’s publicity right and 
gives the assignee full control over the use of the celebrity’s persona.387 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition describes a cause of action 
for violation of a right of publicity arises when “[o]ne who appropriates the 
commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s 
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to 
liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.”388 
While this statement of the law could be read only to recognize liability for 
a violation of a right of publicity and not a stand alone property right, in the 
reporters’ notes, the Restatement clearly stands for the proposition that “[t]he 
interest in the commercial value of a person’s identity is in the nature of a 
property right and is freely assignable to others.”389  If the right is assigned, the 
assignor is prohibited from “exploiting” the right of publicity in a way that 
conflicts with the assignment, and further, is deemed to have consented to the 
use of his or her name and likeness by the assignee.390  “Thus, conduct by the 
assignee that would otherwise violate the publicity or privacy rights of the 
assignor is privileged if the use is within the terms of the assignment.”391 
Even though the right of publicity has its historical roots in the tort of 
privacy,392 both the McCarthy treatise and the Restatement take the position 
that the right is alienable regardless of that history.393 Based on that reasoning, 
 
 
385
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14. 
 
386
 Id. 
 
387
 Id. 
 
388
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
 
389
 Id.  § 46 cmt. g (emphasis added). 
 
390
 Id. 
 
391
 Id. 
 
392
 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1357–58 (noting that “publicity rights have never been 
completely severed from their roots in privacy, and the property-privacy tension is clearly implicated by the 
prospect of placing publicity rights in the hands of the highest bidder as a result of debt collection or 
bankruptcy.”). 
 
393
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
46 cmt. g (1995). 
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in those states that have recognized the right of publicity as distinct from the 
right of privacy, where the right is fully assignable,394 it should function as a 
general intangible under Article 9.  Any possible conflict between the 
historical non-assignability of a personal tort based on invasion of privacy and 
the full alienability of the right of publicity should be resolved in favor of 
permitting transfer of the individual’s publicity right.395 
The reporters’ notes do provide a caveat to the broad property right basis 
for protection: “an assignment of the right of publicity transfers only the right 
to exploit the commercial value of the assignor’s identity; the personal interests 
protected under the right of privacy are not transferable, and thus invasions of 
those rights by third persons remain actionable by the assignor.”396 
This is a curious limitation.  Given that “the right of publicity protects an 
individual’s interest in personal dignity and autonomy”397 akin to a right of 
privacy, could this be a distinction without a difference?  In other words, if a 
person retains the right to sue for an invasion of privacy based on false light, 
even if that person has transferred the right of publicity, what is the right of 
publicity really worth?  Is it truly a stand alone right, in the nature of property, 
or does it retain its strong links to the tort of the invasion of privacy and 
protection of the interest of the celebrity to be free from not having his or her 
name or likeness used commercially without permission?  If so, is it a right that 
can really ever be foreclosed upon and sold to repay a loan? 
 
 
394
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g (1995). 
 
395
 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1357–67. 
An exemption for publicity rights [from treating them as assets in the debtor-creditor system] 
would have to proceed, of course, from an assumption that the associational and dignitary interests 
at stake outweigh the benefits of treating these rights like other ordinary assets in the debtor-
creditor system. We question whether such an assumption is valid. 
Id. at 1361.  Not all commentators agree that the right of publicity should be treated as fully separate from the 
underlying personal interest of the individual.  See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a 
Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 408–09 (1999) (“The problem is that in the process of defining 
the right of publicity as a strictly economic property right (even while tort law clung to that fourth prong of 
privacy), the right of publicity lost a crucial part of its raison d’être as a right based on, and protective of, 
personal autonomy.”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of 
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
151. 
 
396
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. g. 
 
397
 Id.  § 46 cmt. c. 
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The Restatement posits the following example to highlight the distinction: 
A, a famous actress, assigns to B the right to exploit the commercial 
value of A’s identity. C, without the permission of either A or B, 
markets posters that feature A’s picture in a pose that places A before 
the public in a false light. C is subject to liability to B, but not to A, 
for an appropriation of the commercial value of A’s identity under the 
rule stated in this Section. C is subject to liability to A, but not to B, 
for placing A before the public in a false light under the rule stated in 
Restatement, Second, Torts § 652E.398 
This example stands for the proposition that that rights of publicity are, and 
should be, fully alienable.  It also reinforces the idea that a person has several 
different interests tied up in his or her identity: in the example the interest, or 
more appropriately the right to use one’s identity for trade, and the interest in 
being free from being placed before the public in a false light.  They appear to 
exist separate from each other, one alienable, one not. 
What if the example is put in an Article 9 default, repossession and sale 
context?  As revised, the facts might go like this: 
A, a famous actress, grants a security interest to B in the commercial 
value of A’s identity, to secure repayment of a loan.  A defaults, and 
so B exercises its right to “repossess” under UCC sections 9-601 to 
9-625, and takes possession of A’s right of publicity.  In order for this 
to be a meaningful transfer, B would have to receive an assignment of 
all of A’s right of publicity.  B then sells—reassigns—the right to C, 
through a private sale.  Assuming that the sale is commercially 
reasonable, C is the owner of A’s identity for commercial use.  C then 
uses A’s identity to market products without A’s consent. 
According to the Restatement, the assignment and subsequent sale of A’s 
right to publicity in the above example should be fully permitted.  In fact, it is 
a logical consequence of the acceptance of the concept of the full alienability 
of a right of publicity.399  But several questions arise from this conclusion.  
First, is A forever estopped from endorsing a product or service, even if the 
 
 
398
 Id. § 46 cmt. g, illus. 1; see MJ & Partners Rest. Ltd. P’ship v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998) (exclusive licensee of Michael Jordan’s right of publicity has standing to sue for misappropriation of 
that right). 
 
399
 Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1362 (“Furthermore, the very concept of alienability means 
that the law contemplates the real possibility that celebrities will assign all or part of the right to use their 
personas to others—at which point they necessarily give up, albeit voluntarily, any legal right to object to how 
the assignee uses their identities in the future.”). 
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original assignee no longer “owns” her right of publicity?  Presumably so, 
because she assigned that right to B.400  Would a movie studio be foreclosed 
from using A’s name or likeness to promote a movie she is in if C did not 
consent?  Probably not, because the studio would only be promoting the truth 
about its movie—that A is in it. This is most likely a form of nominative fair 
use.
401
  But movie merchandising containing images of A is probably 
prohibited because of the commercial nature of the use of a celebrity’s name or 
likeness. 402 
What if C uses A’s identity to market products that A would not otherwise 
endorse?  A would have no claim for misappropriation of her identity because 
she no longer owns the right to use her identity for purposes of trade.  Could A 
sue under some other theory?  This problem demonstrates where the 
bifurcation of the identity of a celebrity may become problematic.  If A 
believes that she is portrayed in a false light because of the implied 
endorsement of a product she does not like, it would seem that she could bring 
a cause of action under invasion of privacy.  For example, if actress A does not 
drink, and C uses her name and likeness to promote a brand of beer,403 A may 
have both a defamation tort and a false light tort under Restatement (Second) 
of Torts sections 565 and 625E, respectively404  In addition, she may have a 
deceptive marketing claim under Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
section 4.405 
If C is limited, however, in the products that it can sell using the celebrity’s 
name and likeness, because of possible liability to A for violation of her 
privacy rights, can it be said that C really owns A’s right of publicity?  
Conversely, if A is estopped from making claims against C regardless of the 
 
 
400
 Id. at 1355 (citing Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(holding that a baseball player could not transfer exclusive rights to use his image on a baseball card and then 
turn around and grant exclusive rights for the same purpose to someone else.)) (“Clearly, the celebrity must 
refrain from exercising the right of publicity once it is owned by someone else so as not to negate the value of 
the asset that has been transferred.”). 
 
401
 See MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 11:45. 
 
402
 See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1356 (“For example, a model like Cindy Crawford earns 
her livelihood wearing clothes and makeup designed by others.  In some instances, when she shows the clothes 
and makeup she is pursuing her primary career as a fashion model.  In others, she may be exhibiting herself in 
the clothes or makeup specifically to endorse them as products.  Distinguishing one from the other might be 
difficult, but courts are no strangers to this kind of line-drawing . . . .”). 
 
403
 Cf. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692–94 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding former major 
league baseball pitcher, who was a recovering alcoholic, had stated an adequate claim under California 
statutory and common law for misappropriation of his likeness in an advertisement for beer). 
 
404
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995). 
 
405
 Id. 
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nature of the products C is marketing, does that not deprive her of the ability to 
protect her name and reputation guaranteed under the right of publicity? 
(b) Right of Publicity Most Likely a General Intangible, but . . . 
The right of publicity, where recognized as a right that is separate from the 
right of privacy, would tend to fall into the category of general intangible.  As 
suggested by Professor McCarthy, this is the trend in many states, where the 
right of publicity is protected for upwards of 100 years after a celebrity’s 
death.406  Thus, it is easy to say that the right stands apart from an interest in 
the celebrity where the celebrity does not need to be alive for the right to be 
protected.  Also, it is increasingly recognized as transferable right, both during 
the celebrity’s life and after death.407  Lisa Marie Presley sold rights to her 
father’s name and likeness for $100 million, and Elvis Presley is listed as 
Forbes’ top earning dead celebrity, bringing in a total of $40 million in 
2003.408 
There is a significant trend to recognize the right of publicity as a fully 
assignable and inheritable right.  Certainly, this is likely to maximize the value 
of the right, because advertisers are likely to increase the price they are willing 
to pay for the right if they can obtain “ownership” of a celebrity’s persona for 
marketing purposes.  This will also maximize the right’s value as a piece of 
commercial property, because a lender is more likely to accept a right of 
publicity as collateral if the right is fully alienable.  This means that a right of 
publicity is likely to be considered a general intangible. 
Even so, there are aspects of this right that do not fit well with such a 
categorization, particularly if the celebrity is still alive.  For example, 
following Professor McCarthy’s view, the right should be fully alienable.409  
This would allow a secured creditor to foreclose and sell the asset to seek 
repayment of the loan secured by the right.  Only in this way can the creditor 
fully use the right as collateral.410 
 
 
406
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 6:8. 
 
407
 Id. § 10:13. 
 
408
 Lisa DiCarlo, Reaping Millions After Death, FORBES.COM, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/ 
business/2004/10/25/cx_ld_1025deadcelebsintro.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). See also Jacoby & 
Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1331–32 (describing efforts by singer David Bowie, baseball player Frank 
Thomas, and rap singer Sean Combs to “securitize the value of their identities”). 
 
409
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14. 
 
410
 Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1364 (“[T]he overall philosophy of our current debtor-
creditor system puts the interests of the creditor in forcing the sale of the debtor’s assets—publicity rights or 
otherwise—ahead of the preferences of the delinquent debtor.”). 
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But this has some strange and unwelcome consequences, both for the 
celebrity and also for the public.  For example, assume that John Q. Celeb 
signs a security agreement with First Bank that lists “general intangibles” as a 
type of collateral covered by the bank’s security interest.  As a result, if the 
right is a general intangible, Celeb will have granted a security interest in his 
right of publicity to First Bank without specifically listing it. 
When Celeb defaults on the payment, First Bank will have a right to 
repossess Celeb’s right of publicity.411  First Bank, in order to seek repayment 
of the loan, can then proceed with a sale of Celeb’s publicity right through 
either a public or private sale.  The buyer will obtain full ownership of that 
right.412  Assuming Celeb’s right of publicity is fully alienable, the owner of 
the right can use Celeb’s name and likeness to sell any product the owner 
wishes, regardless of the impact such marketing would have on the celebrity.  
If not, saying that the right is fully alienable would have no meaning.  Celeb’s 
publicity right must transfer without any restrictions, otherwise Celeb’s 
publicity right would have much less value. 
To be alienable would mean that Celeb’s name and likeness can appear in 
advertising for products that Celeb does not endorse and in a form to which the 
celebrity does not consent.  Even if Celeb dislikes the product, no action may 
lie, presumably, because the advertiser either owns or has licensed from the 
owner the celebrity’s publicity right.  This immediately raises the specter of a 
claim by Celeb for false endorsement, assuming the nature of the product is 
anathema to Celeb.  Conversely, perhaps the advertiser of Celeb’s right of 
publicity has a cause of action to prevent Celeb from interfering with the 
advertiser’s use of Celeb’s name and likeness. 
Professor McCarthy suggests that such a view is correct; a celebrity should 
be fully capable of assigning his or her right of publicity without restriction.413  
He posits several reasons why there are circumstances when it is appropriate to 
assign a right of publicity, such as assigning the right to a corporation for tax 
purposes414 or for estate planning purposes while the celebrity is alive.415  He 
notes that the courts possess the power to undo transfers made under duress or 
due to fraud or mistake, “[b]ut in the ordinary situation of a freely bargained 
 
 
411
 U.C.C. §§ 9-601, 9-609 (2000). 
 
412
 Id. § 9-401. 
 
413
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10.14.  Other commentators agree.  See, e.g., Jacoby & 
Zimmerman, supra note 380, at 1357–67. 
 
414
 PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 59, § 10:14. 
 
415
 Id. § 10:14. 
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assignment devoid of any overtones of pressure or unfair advantage, the courts 
should treat persons as freely consenting adults, capable of adequately 
protecting themselves in assignments of the right of publicity.”416 
The problem with this scenario is that if the right of publicity is treated as a 
general intangible, the assignment can be made without any explicit reference 
to the celebrity’s publicity right—the mere mention of “general intangibles” 
would capture that right in the security agreement.  Any default would trigger 
the right to repossess and sell the right,417 including mere technical defaults to 
the loan.  Article 9 does not appear to allow for a different result if the right of 
publicity is to be treated as a general intangible.418 
CONCLUSION 
With the adoption of Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9, the 
states have added a new form of collateral available to creditors—commercial 
torts.  With this expansion of the types of collateral to include commercial 
torts, it is appropriate to reevaluate whether the characterization of the broad 
collection of rights termed intellectual property as general intangibles is 
appropriate.  While it appears that the drafters of Revised Article 9 intended 
for the primary forms of federally protected intellectual property, namely 
patents, trademarks, and copyrights, to be so categorized, the same is not 
necessarily true of state-based and secondary intellectual property rights. 
When considering the co-relative nature of these rights—the protection of 
interests relating to the owner of the rights—and the inability to transfer such 
rights in a meaningful way, it is likely that a strong argument can be made that 
they should be treated as commercial torts as opposed to general intangibles.  
This will limit creditors’ ability to obtain perfected security interests in such 
intellectual property rights, and allow the debtor, or the trustee in bankruptcy, 
to avoid the effect of such security interests. 
Whether this has a positive or negative impact on the business of lending is 
questionable.  In some cases, this will have the positive impact of avoiding 
overly aggressive behavior by lenders in a way that inhibits commerce, such as 
those claiming a security interest in the ephemeral trade secret knowledge of 
employees.  However, it may cause the value of such information to decline in 
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417
 U.C.C. § 9-609 (2000). 
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the marketplace if creditors cannot rely on such collateral to seek repayment in 
the event of default.  This is likely true with moral rights and the right of 
publicity. 
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